Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 59

Issue 2

Article 6

2009

Down but Not out: Why Giles Leaves Forfeiture by Wrongdoing
Still Standing
Marc McAllister

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Marc McAllister, Down but Not out: Why Giles Leaves Forfeiture by Wrongdoing Still Standing, 59 Case W.
Rsrv. L. Rev. 393 (2009)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol59/iss2/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an
authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

DOWN BUT NOT OUT: WHY GILES
LEAVES FORFEITURE BY
WRONGDOING STILL STANDING
Marc MeAllisterf

[The] detective's Holy Trinity
solve crimes:

. . .

states that three things

Physical evidence.
Witnesses.
Confessions.
Without one of the first two elements, there is little chance
that a detective will find a suspect capable of providing the
third. A murder investigation, after all, is an endeavor
limited by the very fact that the victim-unlike those who are
robbed, raped or seriously assaulted-is no longer in a
position to provide much informnation.'

tAssistant Professor, Florida Coastal School of Law. The author received his J.D., cum
laude, from the University of Notre Dame Law School, and clerked for Judge Charles Wilson of
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. The author's previous publications include Two-Way
Video Trial Testimony and the Confrontation Clause: Fashioninga Better Craig Test in Light of
Crawford, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 835 (2007); Judicial Review of Administrative Agency
Action in Germany and the United States, in 2006 ANNUAL OF GERMAN AND EuROPEAN LAW,
Volume 11111 (Berghahn Books); and What the High Court Giveth the Lower Courts Taketh
Away: How to Prevent Undue Scrutiny of Police Officer Motivations Without Eroding
Randolph's Heightened Fourth Amendment Protections,56 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 663 (2008).
1DAVID SIMON, HOMICIDE: A YEAR ON THE KILLING STREETs 73 (Holt Paperbacks
2006) (1991).
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INTRODUCTION

The forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine ("forfeiture") is an
equitable doctrine2 with deep historical roots.3 The forfeiture doctrine
prevents an individual accused of criminal activity from invoking
legal protections created by his wrongful acts.4 Being an equitable
doctrine, this rule is grounded "in the maxim that no one shall be
2 See People v. Giles, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 843, 848 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) ("Forfeiture [by
wrongdoing] is a logical extension of the equitable principle that no person should benefit from
his own wrongful acts."), aff'd, 152 P.3d 433 (Cal. 2007), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 976 (2008),
vacated, 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008); see also Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1202 (6th Cir. 1982)
(analogizing the principle underlying forfeiture by wrongdoing to the "equitable doctrine of
'clean hands,"' in that both prevent a party from deriving any benefit from his or her own
wrongdoing).
3See Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. 231, 232-33 (1959) ("To decide the
case we need look no further than the maxim that no man may take advantage of his own wrong.
Deeply rooted in our jurisprudence this principle has been applied in many diverse classes of
cases by both law and equity courts. .. ); Ridgeway's Case, (1594) 76 Eng. Rep. 753, 755
(K.B.) (indicating that forfeiture has been part of English law since the sixteenth century).
4 See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158 (1878).
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permitted to take advantage of his own wrong."' In two recent cases,
Crawford v. Washington6and Davis v. Washington,' the United States
Supreme Court reaffirmed forfeiture as one of two core exceptions to
the right of a criminal defendant to confront his accusers. 8 When this
exception applies, a criminal defendant may not assert his right to
confront an unavailable witness when the defendant has wrongfully
procured the witness's absence.
An integral part of the Sixth Amendment, 9 the right of a criminal
defendant to confront his accusers is fundamental to our system of
justice.1 0 While the constitutional right of confrontation has been said
to serve various purposes,"' today it essentially guarantees a criminal
12
defendant the right to cross-examine those who testify against him.
5Id at 159. See also State v. Alvarez-Lopez, 98 P.3d 699, 705 (N.M. 2004) ("One of the
primary purposes of the forfeiture by wrongdoing rule is 'to deter criminals from intimidating or
"taking care of' potential witnesses."' (quoting United States v. Thompson, 286 F.3d 950, 962
(7th Cir. 2002))).
6 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
7 547 U.S. 813, 833-34 (2006) ("The Roberts approach to the Confrontation Clause
undoubtedly made recourse to th~e forfeiture] doctrine less necessary, because prosecutors could
show the 'reliability' of ex parte statements more easily than they could show the defendant's
procurement of the witness's absence. Crawford, in overruling Roberts, did not destroy the
ability of courts to protect the integrity of their proceedings."). Davis was decided together with
Hammon v. Indiana on certiorari to the Supreme Court of Indiana. Id. at 813.
8 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62. The Crawford Court noted, "the 'right .. , to be confronted
with the witnesses against him,' is most naturally read as a reference to the right of
confrontation at common law, admitting only those exceptions established at the time of the
founding." Id. at 54 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI) (omission in original) (citation omnitted).
Forfeiture by wrongdoing is one of these exceptions as it is a founding era doctrine. See id at 62
(ratifyiing the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing, and noting that the rule "extinguishes
confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds").
9The Sixth Amendment assures the right of an accused "to be confronted with the
witnesses against him." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
'0 The primary right advanced by the Clause-the right of cross-examination-has been
deemed "'.the "greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth." Maryland v.
Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 846 (1990) (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970)); see
also People v. Geraci, 649 N.E.2d 817, 822 (N.Y. 1995) (noting the societal significance of the
right of confrontation, and "'.the intimate association between the right to confrontation and the
accuracy of the fact-finding process"'. (quoting United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 631 (5th
Cir. Unit B 1982))).
1See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51 (1987) ("The Confrontation Clause
provides two types of protections for a criminal defendant: the right physically to face those
who testify' against him, and the right to conduct cross-examination." (citing Delaware v.
Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 18-19 (1985) (per curiamn))); see also Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S.
237, 242-43 (1895) ("The primary object of the [Confrontation Clause] was to prevent
depositions or ex porte affidavits . . . being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal
examination and cross-examination of the witness in which the accused has an opportunity, not
only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him
to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may ... judge .. ,. whether he is worthy of
belief.").
12 See State v. Webb, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 103, 104 (Sup. L. & Eq. 1794) (per curiam)
(recognizing that the confrontation right ensures that no criminal defendant "be prejudiced by
evidence which he had not the liberty to cross examine"); see also Crawford, 541 U.S. at 55-56
("We do not read the historical sources to say that a prior opportunity to cross-examine was
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Like the forfeiture doctrine, the confrontation right has deep equitable
roots.' 3

Indeed, a case decided just three years after the Sixth

Amendment's adoption described the confrontation right as one
4
"founded on natural justice."'9

Throughout our nation's history, courts have held that a
defendant's right of confrontation must sometimes yield due to
forfeiture,"5 effectively admitting an absent witness's statements into
evidence despite the lack of opportunity for cross-examination.
In certain instances of wrongdoing, forfeiture easily trumps the
defendant's confrontation right. For example, when a criminal
defendant has bribed or intimidated a witness with the intent of
preventing the witness from testifying, the defendant is unable to
invoke his right to cross-examine that witness. 16 But unlike the
bribery context, where the briber's very actions signal an intent to
prevent trial testimony, not all "wrongful acts" that have the effect of
preventing a witness from testifying should necessarily trigger the
forfeiture exception. For example, a defendant who negligently and
unknowingly collides into a witness's automobile the evening before
trial, causing her to miss her scheduled testimony, would not forfeit
his confrontation right.'17 This is true even though the defendant's
negligence is considered "wrongful." Between these extremes,
however, is a plethora of wrongdoing that may or may not trigger the
forfeiture exception.

merely a sufficient, rather than a necessary, condition for admissibility of testimonial
statements. They suggest that this requirement was dispositive, and not merely one of several
ways to establish reliability."); Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414 (1985) ("The Clause's
fundamental role i[s] protecting the right of cross-examination...)
13 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43-46 (noting that the confrontation right dates hack to
Roman times and was an established part of English common law by the seventeenth century).
14 Webb, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) at 104.
15 See, e.g., United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1360 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding the
defendant waived his right to confrontation when he intimidated a witness into not testi1ring at
trial); see also Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243 ("[G]eneral rules of law of this kind . .. must
occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case. To say
that a criminal, after having once been convicted by the testimony of a certain witness, should
go scot free simply because death has closed the mouth of that witness, would be carrying his
constitutional protection to an unwarrantable extent. The law in its wisdom declares that the
rights of the public shall not be wholly sacrificed in order that an incidental benefit may be
preserved to the accused."); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158 (1878) (stating that the
Constitution "grants [the accused] the privilege of being confronted with the witnesses against
him; but if he voluntarily keeps the witnesses away, he cannot insist on his privilege").
16 See Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2691 (2008) ("Thie common-law forfeiture rule
was aimed at removing the otherwise powerful incentive for defendants to intimidate, bribe, and
kill the witnesses against them ... )
11 See People v. Giles, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 843, 850 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (providing a similar
example), aff'd, 152 P.3d 433 (Cal. 2007), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 976 (2008), vacated, 128 S.
Ct. 2678 (2008).
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Between 2004 and 2008, lower courts struggled'18 to resolve
whether the forfeiture exception required wrongdoing speci~fically
intended to prevent testimony against the accused. Being an equitable
doctrine, and given the Court's broad endorsements of the doctrine in
both Crawford 9 and Davis, 0 many courts erred on the side of
evidence admission.' With a line of cases on both sides,2 the
Supreme Court in Giles v. California23 sought to resolve this issue.
In Giles, the defendant argued that his confrontation rights were
violated when the court admitted out-of-court statements made by his
shooting victim several weeks prior to her death. The victim's
challenged statements demonstrated Giles's tendency for violence
towards her, thereby casting doubt on his claim of self-defense.2
Despite Giles's confrontation objection, the trial court admitted the
evidence, and Giles was convicted of first-degree murder.2

Is See. e.g., State v. Romero, 133 P.3d 842, 850 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006) ("Despite
widespread acceptance of the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing, however, there has been
some confusion over its requirements. Specifically . . . courts have disagreed over the
[applicability of an] intent requirement.)
affd, 156 P.3d 694 (N.M. 2007).
19 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62 ("[T~he rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing (which we accept)
extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds.")
20 547 U.S. 813, 833 (2006) ("[W]hen defendants seek to undermine the judicial process
by procuring or coercing silence from witnesses and victims, the Sixth Amendment does not
require courts to acquiesce. While defendants have no duty to assist the State in proving their
guilt, they do have the duty to refrain from acting in ways that destroy the integrity of the
criminal-trial system. We reiterate . . . that 'the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing...
extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds.' That is, one who obtains
the absence of a witness by wrongdoing forfeits the constitutional right to confrontation."
(citation omnitted) (second omnission in original)).
21 See People v. Giles, 152 P.3d 433, 442-44 (Cal. 2007) (citing numerous cases adopting
this approach), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 976 (2008), vacated, 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008).
22 The following cases, among others, explicitly rejected the rule that a defendant must
have intended to prevent the witness from testifying for the forfeiture doctrine to apply: United
States v. Garcia-Meza, 403 F.3d 364, 370-71 (6th Cir. 2005) (applying forfeiture doctrine in
murder case with facts similar to People v. Giles); United States v. Mayhew, 380 F. Supp. 2d
961 (S.D. Ohio 2005) (applying forfeiture doctrine to admit statements of dying victim in
murder case); People v. Moore, 117 P.3d 1, 2-3 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (applying forfeiture
doctrine in murder case); State v. Meeks, 88 P.3d 789 (Kan. 2004) (applying forfeiture doctrine
to facts similar to those in Mayhew), overruled in part by State v. Davis, 158 P.3d 317 (Kan.
2006); State v. Jensen, 727 N.W.2d 518, 534 (Wis. 2007) (applying forfeiture doctrine in
murder case and citing Garcia-Meza). On the other hand, the following cases endorsed the
intent requirement later adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Giles: People v. Moreno, 160
P.3d 242 (Colo. 2007) (for forfeiture to apply, defendant's "wrongful conduct must ... be
designed, at least in part, to subvert the criminal justice system by depriving that system of the
evidence upon which it depends"); Commonwealth v. Edwards, 830 N.E.2d 158, 170 (Mass.
2005) (ruling forfeiture applicable where "defendant acted with the intent to procure the
witness's unavailability"); State v. Romero, 133 P.3d 842, 855-56 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006)
(requiring intent-to-silence to invoke the forfeiture doctrine, and rejecting the state's argument
that the requisite intent can be inferred), affd, 156 P.3d 694 (N.M. 2007).
23 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008).
24 See People v. Giles, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 843, 846 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004), affid, 152 P.3d 433
(Cal. 2007), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 976 (2008), vacated, 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008).
25 Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 3, Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008) (No.
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On appeal in a post-Crawford world,2 the State sought to invoke
the forfeiture exception, arguing that the doctrine applies in all cases
of misconduct rendering a witness unavailable to testify, regardless of
intent.27 Both the California Court of Appeal 28 and the California
Supreme Court endorsed the State's view.2 In a decision that
significantly limited the scope of the forfeiture exception, the United
States Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the accused must have
intended to silence the would-be witness before forfeiture would

apply. 30

Despite its ruling, the Giles Court was severely divided. Although
the Court's primary aim was to apply the forfeiture exception as it
existed at the time of our nation's founding,' five of the nine Justices
ultimately deemed the historical record unable to resolve the
particular intent issue, and four expressed concern with the overall
case outcome.
Given
the
flaws
inherent
in
the
Giles
rule,3
future courts will likely circumvent Giles to prevent criminals from
benefiting by their wrongdoing. Before examining the basis for this
claim, Part I of this Article summarizes the facts of Giles, the state
court opinions, and the various opinions authored by the
Supreme Court Justices. Part 11 demonstrates why the concerns of the
Giles dissenters are valid and will trickle down to post-Giles
decisions. With courts now unable to apply the forfeiture doctrine in
future cases where the equities demand it but where obvious intent

07-6053), 2008 WL 904073.
26 In 2004, as the Giles case moved from trial to initial appeal, the Supreme Court
established a new framework of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence in Crawford, holding that
an out-of-court, testimonial statement is inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause unless the
witness is both unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the
witness. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004) ("Where testimonial statements
are involved, we do not think the Framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment's protection to
amorphous notions of 'reliability."'); see also Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The
*...
Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEo. L.J. 10 11, 1022 (1998) ("The reliability determination
[under Roberts] threatens to become a shadow of the trial on the merits-a battle over the
ultimate factual issues at stake in the prosecution, based on all the evidence presented at trial.").
27 See Giles, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 848.
28 Id. at 85 1.
29 See People v. Giles, 152 P.3d 443, 443 (Cal. 2007), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 976
(2008), vacated, 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008).
30 Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2693 (2008).
31 All nine Justices agreed that the common-law doctrine permitted the introduction of
out-of-court statements "of a witness who was 'detained' or 'kept away' by the 'means or
procurement' of the defendant." Id. at 2683; see also id. at 2695-96 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Interpreting cases from the founding era, the majority concluded that this language-and hence
the doctrine as it existed at comnmon law-applied only when the defendant engaged in conduct
speciically designed to prevent the witness from testifying. Id. at 2687-88 (majority opinion).
32 See discussion infra Part 11.
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evidence 3 3 is lacking, Part III examines the two primary methods
by which lower courts will avoid Giles's grasp, thereby achieving
what many jurists will deem a more equitable result. This Part
contends that courts will evade Giles by easing the burden of
proving its requisite intent, and by broadening the definition of
"non-testimonial," thereby removing the disputed evidence from
Crawford'sreach.
1. THE GILES OPImNIOS

A. Facts
In Giles, the defendant argued his confrontation rights were
violated when the court admitted out-of-court statements made by his
shooting victim prior to her death. Giles's victim, Brenda Avie, had
dated Giles for several years. 34 A few weeks prior to her death,
officers investigated a report involving Giles and Avie .35 According
to one of those officers, Stephen Kotsinadelis, the incident began
when Giles became angry and accused Avie of having an affair.3
According to the officer, Giles grabbed Avie by the shirt, lifted her
off the floor, and choked her. Giles then allegedly climbed on top of
Avie, punched her in the face, and held a knife to Avie while
threatening to kill her.3 Avie's description of these events later
formed the core of the forfeiture dispute at trial.3
A few weeks after this event, Giles was at his grandmother's house
with his new girlfriend, Tameta Munks. 39 After Munks left, Avie
arrived . 40 Family members inside the home heard Giles and Avie
speaking to one another outside .4 1 A series of gunshots then rang
out.4 2

Giles's grandmother ran outside and discovered Giles standing

33 By "obvious intent evidence," I mean the type of intent inherent in relatively clear-cut
cases of witness tampering, such as that found in bribery cases or in the type of case cited by the
dissent in Giles. See Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2703 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Where that motive is
certain, for example where the defendant knows the witness only because she has previously
testified against him, the prior statements would be admitted under the majority's purpose rule
and the question of intent would not [be disputed].").
34 People v. Giles, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 843, 845 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004), aff'd, 152 P.3d 433
(Cal. 2007), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 976 (2008), vacated, 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008).
35 Idat846.
36 Id

37 Id.
38 Id at 846-7.
39 Id. at 845.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id
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near Avie, gun in hand.4 Giles then fled the scene, and was arrested
over two weeks later."4
Upon investigation, police discovered that Avie had been shot six
times in the torso.4 One wound was consistent with her holding up
her hand at the time she was shot, and one suggested she was shot
while lying on the ground.4 Police also discovered that Giles's
weapon fired one bullet at a time, indicating that Giles had pulled the
trigger six times.4 Finally, police confirmed that Avie was not
carrying a weapon at the time of her shooting.4
At trial, Giles admitted the shooting, rendering moot the question
of whether his "wrongdoing" prevented her cross-examination.4
Having admitted the shooting, Giles placed his eggs in the basket of
self-defense.5 In support of this defense, Giles testified and portrayed
Avie as a violent woman . 5 ' Giles claimed that Avie had shot another
man before she met him, and that he had observed her threaten people
with a knife.5 According to Giles, when Avie arrived at his
grandmother's house, Avie threatened to kill him and Munks.5 At
this point, Giles claims to have retrieved a gun stowed under a couch
in the garage. 4 According to Giles, Avie charged toward him, and he
reacted by firing several shots.5 Giles claimed his eyes were closed
56
as he was firing the gun, and that he did not intend to kill.

Over Giles's objection, Officer Kotsinadelis testified regarding the
domestic incident prior to Avie's death. 57 The court admitted these
statements under a California hearsay exception (a ruling which was
permissible at the time under Ohio v. Roberts, but would later not be
under Crawford). 8 With Avie's statements significantly undermining
43 Id
45

Id at 845.
Id

46

People v. Giles, 152 P.3d 433, 436 (Cal. 2007), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 976 (2008),

44

vacated, 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008).
47
48
49
50

Respondent's Brief on the Merits, supra note 25, at 3.
Id at 1.

Idat 2.
Id

51 Id.
52

Id

53 Id
54 People v. Giles, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 843, 846 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004), afd, 152 P.3d 433
(Cal. 2007), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 976 (2008), vacated, 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008).
55 Id
56 Id
57 Id
58 The trial judge deemed the testimony admissible hearsay under California Evidence
Code § 1370, which permits admission of out-of-court statements describing the infliction or
threat of physical injury on a declarant when the declarant is unavailable to testify' at trial and
the prior statements are deemed trustworthy. Respondent's Brief on the Merits, supra note 25, at
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Giles's self-defense claim,59 the jury found Giles guilty of first-degree
murder and imposed a sentence of fifty years to life.6
B. CaliforniaCourt of Appeal Opinion
As Giles awaited initial appeal, the Supreme Court established its
new Confrontation Clause jurisprudence in Crawford, holding that an
out-of-court, testimonial statement is inadmissible at trial unless the
witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to
cross-examine her .6' In replacing the open-ended "reliability" test of
Ohio v. Roberts62 with a rigid cross-examination requirement,
Crawford expanded the Sixth Amendment's protections and
prevented introduction of hearsay admissible under the old regime.6
Citing Crawford, Giles argued on appeal that admission of Avie's
out-of-court statements violated his confrontation right.64 The Court
of Appeal disagreed, ruling instead that Giles forfeited his
confrontation right through his wrongdoing.
In language later
fleshed out by the United States Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal
66
highlighted the following passage from Reynolds v. United States,
the Supreme Court's first major forfeiture decision:
"The Constitution gives the accused the right to a trial at
which he should be confronted with the witnesses against
him; but if a witness is absent by .. . [the accused's] wrongful
procurement, he cannot complain if competent evidence is
admitted to supply the place of that which he has kept
67
away"

2.
Giles, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 846.
Respondent's Brief on the Merits, supra note 25, at 3.
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
62 448 U.S. 56 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
63 The pre-Crawford rule of Ohio v. Roberts allowed admission of unconfronted,
out-of-court statements when those statements either fell within a "firmly rooted hearsay
exception," or were otherwise considered "reliable." Id. at 66. Over time, this standard proved
vague and amorphous, and actually revived the core concern the Confrontation Clause was
meant to eradicate, the so-called "trial by affidavit." See, e.g., Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S.
237, 242-43 (1895) ("The primary object of the [Confrontation Clause] was to prevent
depositions or ex pante affidavits . . . being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal
examination and cross-examination of the witness.").
" Giles, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 846-47.
65 Id at 847. The court noted that Crawford had specifically recognized and accepted
forfeiture by wrongdoing as an exception to its rule that confrontation is required before
testimonial hearsay may be admitted. Id. (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61-62).
- 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
67 Giles, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 848 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158
59

60
61
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Interpreting this crucial passage, Giles argued that a defendant
forfeits his Confrontation Clause objection only when, after being
charged with a crime, he wrongfully procures the witness's absence
from trial with the specific intent to prevent testimony about that
crime.68According to Giles, because he had not been charged with 69a
crime at the time of Avie's shooting, forfeiture should not app ly.
The court again disagreed, reasoning:
Forfeiture is a logical extension of the equitable principle that
no person should benefit from his own wrongful acts. A
defendant whose intentional criminal act renders a witness
unavailable for trial benefits from his crime if he can use the
witness's unavailability to exclude damaging hearsay
statements by the witness that would otherwise be admissible.
This is so whether or not the defendant specifically intended
to prevent the witnessfrom testifying at the time he committed
the act that rendered the witness unavailable. Other courts
have applied forfeiture in [similar] cases ...
Giles next argued that to apply forfeiture here, the court must
effectively deem the defendant guilty of the very crime for which he
is on trial (as this is the same act allegedly rendering the witness
unavailable) .7 ' According to Giles, such a ruling impermissibly
requires the court to assume guilt before guilt is established.7
Rejecting this argument, the court reasoned that judges often make
evidentiary rulings that coincide with an ultimate issue in the case.7
As an example, the court noted that qualifying hearsay statements by
co-conspirators are often admissible against a defendant charged with
conspiracy, even though the very existence of the alleged conspiracy
must be proved before the statement is admitted.7
Turning to the merits, the court found sufficient evidence that
Giles had "procured Avie's unavailability through criminal

(1878)) (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
68

Id.

69
70

Id

72

Id

Id (citing United States v. Emery, 186 F.3d 921, 926 (8th Cir. 1999) (applying
forfeiture doctrine in a murder case); United States v. Miller, 116 F.3d 641 (2d Cir. 1997)
(same); People v. Moore, 117 P.3d 1, 2-3 (Colo. Ct App. 2004) (also applying forfeiture
doctrine in a murder case); State v. Meeks, 88 P.3d 789 (Kan. 2004) (same)) (emphasis added).
71 Id at 849.
73Id
74Id
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conduct"-here, through criminal homicide.7 Before closing, the
court clarified that its rule would only apply upon proof of an
"intentional criminal act"; according to the court, "it is not enough to
commit some act that incidentally produces that result.",7 6 The court
explained its position along the intent continuum with the following
illustration:
In this case, for example, Avie was killed because appellant
intentionally fired a gun at her; it is perfectly appropriate to
conclude that in doing so, he forfeited his right to confront
her . . .. By contrast, if Avie had instead been killed in an
unintentional automobile collision while appellant was
driving, he would have been the technical cause of her
unavailability at any fuiture trial, but his actions could not be
construed as a forfeiture of his right to confront her as a
witness.~
Thus, according to this court, a general criminal intent would be
enough to trigger the forfeiture exception, as opposed to the more
specific intent suggested by the defendant. When combined with the
doctrine that one presumably intends the natural and probable
consequences of his actions,7 this notion of intent essentially views
all intentional killings as incorporating the additional intent to render
the witness unavailable.7
C. CaliforniaSupreme Court Opinion
In affirming the Court of Appeal's ruling,8 the California Supreme
Court first noted Crawford's explicit affirmation of the forfeiture
doctrine.81 The court observed that neither ReynoldS82 nor the lower
75 Id

Id. at 850 (emphasis added).
at 850-5 1.
78 See, e.g., People v. Conley, 543 N.E.2d 138, 143 (111.App. Ct. 1989) ("Although the
State must establish the specific intent [required by the statute], problems of proof are alleviated
[by] the ordinary presumption that one intends the natural and probable consequences of his
actions.").
79 See Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2698 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
80 People v. Giles,. 152 P.3d 433, 435 (Cal. 2007), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 976 (2008),
vacated, 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008). The California Supreme Court began its review by phrasing the
issue as follows: "Did defendant forfeit his ight to confront his ex-girlfriend about the prior
incident of domestic violence by killing her and thus making it impossible for her to be at the
murder trial?" Id The court also asked, "Does the doctrine of 'forfeiture by wrongdoing' apply
where the alleged 'wrongdoing' is the same as the offense for which defendant was on trial?" Id.
The court focused primarily on the first issue, and easily dispensed with the latter one. See id. at
444-45.
81 Id. at 43 7-3 8.
76

77Id.
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courts had adequately resolved the precise intent issue. 3 Accordingly,
the court turned to the doctrine's equitable nature to resolve this issue.
Focusing on the equities, the court noted the "broad equitable
principles" 84 underlying forfeiture, and cited numerous decisions
highlighting the equitable outcome the rule produces.8 According to
the court, excluding the disputed statements here would unfairly tilt
the scales of justice. The court declared:
[Plartially through the victim's own alleged statements,
defendant portrayed [his victim] as a violent, aggressive,
foulmouthed, jealous, and volatile person.
Defendant now argues that admission of the victim's
extrajudicial statements to the police, which conflicted with
his portrayal of the victim as the aggressor, violated his
confrontation rights. Defendant should not be able to take
advantage of his own wrong by using the victim's statements
to bolster his self-defense theory, while capitalizing on her
unavailability and asserting his confrontation rights to prevent
86
the prosecution from using her conflicting statements.
Highlighting the need to create a level evidentiary playing field,
the court rejected Giles's specific intent argument.8 The court then
concluded its opinion by suggesting limitations upon its rule.
According to the court, there must be a showing of "genuineff"
88
unavailability caused by the defendant's "intentional criminal act.",
Further, the state must prove the wrongdoing by a "preponderance of
the evidence , 89 and that proof must be corroborated by "independent
90
... evidence" beyond the unavailable declarant's hearsay.

82 See idat438n.3.

See id at 439-42.
Id at 442.
85 See id at 442-43.
86 Id at 444.
87 Id.
83
84

88 Id at 446.
89 Id But see id at 447-48 (Werdegar, J., concurring) (criticizing the majority for ruling
on this particular issue when the issue was not squarely before the court and was not adequately
briefed by the parties).
90 Id at 446 (majority opinion). But see id at 447-48 (Werdegar, J., concurring) (again
criticizing the majority for addressing this particular issue when the issue was not squarely
before the court).
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D. United States Supreme Court Opinion9 '
Before reviewing the various opinions in Giles, it is helpful to
understand the breakdown of votes. The majority opinion, written by
Justice Scalia, was also signed by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Thomas and Alito; Justices Souter and Ginsburg joined all but Part
11-D-2 of the majority opinion,9 which essentially responds to
arguments raised by the dissent.
Justices Thomas, Alito, and Souter (joined by Justice Ginsburg)
each drafted concurring opinions.93 Notably, Justices Thomas and
Alito both expressed doubt as to whether the statements in Giles were
actually "testimonial." 94 Had the "testimonial" issue been properly
preserved for appeal, it is likely9" that a majority of Justices would
have found the Confrontation Clause not offended by admission of
96
Avie' s statements.
Justice Breyer dissented, and was joined by Justices Stevens and

Kennedy.

97

1. Majority Opinion
The majority began its review by characterizing Crawford as
permitting exceptions to the Confrontation Clause "in cases where an
exception to the confrontation right was recognized at the time of the
founding." 9 8 As in Crawford and Davis, the Court quickly concluded
that forfeiture was indeed a common law exception to the right of
confrontation.9 "
Turning to Part 11, the Court considered whether the specific
forfeiture theory endorsed by the California courts accurately
depicted the "founding-era exception." 00 In Part I1-A, citing Lord
91 Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008).
92 Idat 2680-8 1.
93 See id. at 2693-94 (Thomas, J., concurring); id at 2694 (Alito, J., concurring); id at
2694-95 (Souter, J., concurring in part).
94 See id at 2693-94 (Thomas, J., concurring); id at 2694 (Alito, J., concurring).
95 It is unclear how the dissenting Justices would have ruled on this precise issue. On this
question, the dissent merely states: "It is important to underscore that this case is premised on
the assumption, not challenged here, that the witness' statements are testimonial for purposes of
the Confrontation Clause. With that understanding, we ask whether the defendant, through his
wrongdoing, has forfeited his Confrontation Clause right." Id at 2695 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
96 See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 823-26 (2006) (answering affirmatively the
question of "whether the Confrontation Clause applies only to testimonial hearsay").
97 Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2695-709 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
98 Id. at 2682 (majority opinion).
99 Id at 2683.
100M.d at 2682. Notably, the majority and the dissent each narrowed the issue to this
question, but they disagreed on the historical interpretation. See id; id at 2695-96 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
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Morley's Case1 0 ' and similar decisions from the seventeenth to
nineteenth centuries, the Court characterized the common law
forfeiture doctrine as "permitt[ing] the introduction of statements of a
witness who was 'detained' or 'kept away' by the 'means or
procurement' of the defendant."10 2 Employing a textual interpretation,
the Court interpreted these terms to "suggest that the exception
applied only when the defendant engaged in conduct designed to
prevent the witness from testify'ing." 03
1
Citing an 1828 edition of
Webster's Dictionary,' 04 the Court admitted that "there are definitions
of 'procure' and 'procurement' that would merely require that a
defendant have caused the witness's absence" regardless of intent, but
noted that "other definitions would limit the causality to one that was
designed to bring about the result 'procured."' 105 Ultimately, the
Court concluded that cases and treatises from the founding era
06
adopted a purpose-based definition of the governing terms.'
According to the Court, founding-era cases found prior testimony
admissible when the witness "was kept away by the defendant's
'means and contrivance."' 10 7 In the Court's view, "[tlhis phrase
requires that the defendant have schemed to bring about the absence
from trial that he 'contrived."", 0 8 The Court pointed to an 1858
treatise that made the purpose requirement explicit by declaring the
forfeiture rule applicable when a witness "'had been kept out of the
way by the prisoner .. . in order to prevent him from giving evidence
against him.""109 According to the Court, founding-era courts applied
0
the exception in a manner consistent with this definition. "
The Court devoted Part 11-B of its opinion to an argument that
testimony was excluded in cases where the defendant had caused a
person to be absent, but had not done so to prevent the person from
1016 How. St. Tr. 769 (H.L. 1666).
102
Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2683 (citing. for example, Lord Morley's Case, 6 How. St. Tr. at
771).
103Id

1'Th Court cited a Webster's Dictionary from 1828: "[Djefining 'procure' as 'to
contrive and effect".. and also as "'to get; to gain; to obtain; as by request, loan, effort, labor or
purchase."' Id (quoting 2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (1828)). The Court also cited a recent Oxford English Dictionary: "[D]efmning
'procure' as '[t]o contrive or devise with care (an action or proceeding); to endeavour to cause
or bring about (mostly something evil) to or for a person."' Id (quoting 12 THE OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 559 (2d ed. 1989) (definition 1(3) of "procure") (second alteration in
original)).
105SId.
106Id

at 2683-84.

107Id at 2684.
108Id
109Id

1858)).
"Ol d.

(citing EDMUND POWELL, THE PRACTICE OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 166 (1st ed.
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testifying."' According to the Court, "[p]rosecutors do not appear to
have even argued' for admission of the unconfronted statements
because the defendant committed the murder for which he was on
trial.'"2 Citing a line of cases from the late 1700s and early 1800s that
failed to invoke the forfeiture doctrine,' 13 the Court concluded this
section with perhaps its most persuasive argument:
There is nothing mysterious about courts' refusal to [omit a
purpose requirement]. The notion that judges may strip the
defendant of a right that the Constitution deems essential to a
fair trial, on the basis of a prior judicial assessment that the
defendant is guilty as charged, does not sit well with the right
to trial by jury. It is akin, one might say, to "dispensing with
4
jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty.""
In Part 11-C of its opinion, the Court argued that, "not only was the
State's proposed exception ...not an 'exceptio[n] established at the
time of the founding,' it is not established in American jurisprudence
since the founding."' '5 According to the Court, American courts had
not applied the exception to cases beyond deliberate witness
tampering until 1985.' 16 Recognizing that Reynolds can reasonably be
construed to undercut this argument," 7 the Court downplayed the

I"'IId. at 2684-86.

1i2]d at 2684.
3

See id. at 2684-86 (citing, for example, King v. Dingier, (1791) 168 Eng. Rep. 383, in
which the court excluded the unconfronted deposition of George Dingier's wife, who was
allegedly stabbed multiple times by her husband and who was deposed by a magistrate, under
oath, before she died).
4
11
1d at 2686 (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004)); see also United
States v. Lentz, 282 F. Supp. 2d 399, 426 (E.D. Va. 2002) ("The Government argues that the
forfeiture by wrongdoing exception applies ... because Defendant procured the unavailability
of Ms. Lentz by killing her. . .. Essentially, the Government asks the Court to find Defendant
guilty of killing Ms. Lentz by a preponderance of the evidence in order to allow the evidence to
be admitted to prove Defendant killed Ms. Lentz beyond a reasonable doubt. ... Defendant is
presumed to be innocent until proven guilty. To hold otherwise would be to deprive a defendant
of his right to a jury trial and allow for a judge to preliminarily convict a defendant of the crime
on which he was charged."), affd, 58 F. App'x 961 (4th Cir. 2003).
115Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2687 (citation omitted).
116Id ("The earliest case identified by the litigants . .. which admitted unconfronted
statements on a forfeiture theory without evidence that the defendant had acted with the purpose
of preventing the witness from testify'ing was decided in 1985." (citing United States v. Rouco,
983 (11Ith Cir. 1985))).
765 F.2d
7
11 See id ("Reynolds invoked broad forfeiture principles to explain its holding.
The decision stated, for example, that '[tihe Constitution does not guarantee an accused
person against the legitimate consequences of his own wrongful acts,' and that the
wrongful-procurement rule 'has its foundation' in the principle that no one should be permitted
to take advantage of his wrong..."(quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158-59
(1879)) (alteration in original) (citation omnitted)).
11
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admittedly "broad forfeiture principles"" 8 invoked in Reynolds, and
declared:
Reynolds relied on these [broad] maxims (as the commonlaw authorities had done) to be sure. But it relied on them (as
the common-law authorities had done) to admit prior
testimony . .. where the defendant had engaged in wrongful
9
conduct designed to prevent a witness's testimony."
The Court next argued that the "modem view" of the forfeiture
doctrine supported its interpretation.12 0 The Court cited Federal Rule
of Evidence 804(b)(6), which applies only when the defendant
"'engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did,
procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness.", 12 1 The Court
also reasoned that seven of the twelve states that recognize forfeiture
by wrongdoing duplicate the language of the federal rule,12 2 and only
23
Oregon has adopted the alternative view.1
Before addressing the dissent in Part II-D, the Court summarized
its reasoning as follows:
In sum, our interpretation of the common-law forfeiture
rule is supported by (1) the most natural reading of
the language used at common law; (2) the absence of
common-law cases admitting prior statements on a forfeiture
theory when the defendant had not engaged in conduct
designed to prevent a witness from testifying; (3) the
common law's uniform exclusion of unconfronted
inculpatory testimony by murder victims (except testimony
given with awareness of impending death) in the innumerable
cases in which the defendant was on trial for killing the
victim, but was not shown to have done so for the purpose of
preventing testimony; (4) a subsequent history in which the
dissent's broad forfeiture theory has not been applied. The
first two and the last are highly persuasive; the third is in our
24
view conclusive.1

121Id (quoting FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6)).
122Id. at
1 4

2688 n.2.

2 M. at 2688.
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In Part JI-E, 12 1 the majority arguably retreated from its
freshly-minted rule by declaring that the rule's requisite intent may be
inferred in domestic abuse cases. The Court explained:
Acts of domestic violence often are intended to dissuade a
victim from resorting to outside help, and include conduct
designed to prevent testimony to police officers or
cooperation in criminal prosecutions. Where such an abusive
relationship culminates in murder, the evidence may support
a finding that the crime expressed the intent to isolate the
victim and to stop her from reporting abuse to the authorities
or cooperating with a criminal prosecution-rendering her
prior statements admissible under the forfeiture doctrine.
Earlierabuse, or threats of abuse, intended to dissuade the
victim from resorting to outside help would be highly relevant
to this inquiry.... 12
In dissent, Justice Breyer interpreted the above passage to indicate
"that a showing of domestic abuse is [alone] sufficient to [invoke] the
protection of the forfeiture rule in a trial for murder of the domestic

abuse victim," 127 which, in his view, significantly undermines the
majority's intent requirement.
In closing, the Court remanded the case to determine whether the
28
requisite intent evidence exists.1
2. First Concurring Opinion-JusticeThomas
Justice Thomas, who signed the majority opinion, wrote separately
to argue that Avie's statement was not "testimonial," and hence
beyond the reach of the Confrontation Clause.12 9 According to
Thomas, the statements here were similar to those deemed
non-testimonial in Hammon v. Indiana.130 Like the statements in
Hammon, the police questioning of Avie was not sufficiently formal
because "'the statements were neither Mirandized nor custodial, nor
accompanied by any similar indicia of formality."",3' Ultimately,
however, because the State had not preserved this issue for appeal and
125Because Part 11-D responds to the dissent's argument in Giles, the concurring and
dissenting opinions are summarized first before turning to the discussion of Part 11-D.
126Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2693 (emphasis added).
127Id. at 2708 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
128Id. at 2693 (majority opinion).
29
1 See id. at 2693-94 (Thomas, J., concurring).
130Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) (Hammon v. Indiana is referenced by docket
No. 05-5 705, and was decided together with Davis v. Washington).
131Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2693 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 840).
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because Justice Thomas agreed with the majority's characterization of
"Confrontation Clause jurisprudence where the applicability of that
Clause is not at issue," Justice Thomas felt the California Supreme
132
Court opinion should be vacated.
3. Second ConcurringOpinion-JusticeAlito
In his concurring opinion, Justice Alito agreed with Justice
Thomas that Avie's out-of-court statement did not, in fact, implicate
34
the Confrontation Clause.' 33 In language that supports my thesis,1
Justice Alito opined:
The dissent's displeasure with the result in this case is
understandable, but I suggest that the real problem concerns
the scope of the confrontation right. The Confrontation
Clause does not apply to out-of-court statements unless it can
be said that they are the equivalent of statements made at trial
by "witnesses." It is not at all clear that Ms. Avie's statement
falls within that category. But th[at] question. ...is not before
us....135
Like Justice Thomas, Justice Alito signaled a willingness to
endorse a rather narrow definition of "testimonial," which would have
resulted in a favorable ruling for the State had the issue been properly
raised. Moreover, by affirming the dissent's "displeasure with the
result in this case," Justice Alito became the fourth Justice to show
36
concern with the overall outcome.'1
4. FinalConcurring Opinion-JusticesSouter and Ginsburg
Justices Souter and Ginsburg agreed that forfeiture applies only
when the defendant brings about the witness's absence "with intent to
prevent testimony."' 37 These Justices were primarily persuaded by the
persuaded
majority's "question begging" argument. 1'Tewrenot
by the historical record, concluding that "[tlhe contrast between the
Court's and Justice [Breyer] 's careful examinations of the historical
record tells me that the early cases on the exception were not

1321d.

at 2694.

(Alito, J., concurring).
I- 'See infra Part 1I.B.
15Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2694 (Alito, J., concurring) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
133Id

136Id
137Id at 2694 (Souter,
38
1 See supra note 114.

J., concurring).
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calibrated finely enough to answer the narrow question here." 3 In
part this is because "today's understanding of domestic abuse had no
apparent significance at the time of the Framing," which accounts for
40
the lack of an early example of forfeiture in that context.1
In language that again supports my thesis,'14 ' Justices Souter and
Ginsburg concluded that "the element of intention would normally be
satisfied by the intent inferred on the part of the domestic abuser in
the classic abusive relationship,"14 2 where the abuser normally intends
"to isolate the victim from outside help, including the aid of law
enforcement and the judicial process."14 3 According to these Justices,
if the evidence showed a continuing abusive relationship of this sort,
the intent required by Giles should be inferred.'"
5. Dissent-JusticesBreyer, Stevens, and Kennedy
The dissenting opinion was separated into four primary parts. 145 In
Part I, citing Lord Morley's Case and similar founding-era cases, the
dissent found sufficient evidence satisfying Crawford's threshold
requirement that the forfeiture exception be established by the time of
46
the nation's founding.'1

In Part II, the dissent identified "several strong reasons" for
concluding that forfeiture applies in the absence of the majority's
required specific intent. 14 7 Beginning with the majority's textualist
argument, the dissent first argued that the language common law
courts "used in setting forth the exception is broad enough to cover
the wrongdoing at issue in the present case (murder)
."' " The
dissenters reasoned:
A witness whom a defendant murders is kept from testifying
"by the means . . . of the prisoner" i.e., the defendant; murder
is indeed an "ill practice," that leads to the witness' absence;
one can fairly call a murder a "contrivance to keep the
witness out of the way"; murder, if not a "fraudulent and
'39 Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2694 (Souter, J., concurring).
140M. at 2695.
41
1 See infra Part W.A.
42
1 Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2695 (Souter, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
143 Id.
144Id But see id. at 2695-709 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that in the domestic abuse
context, where a victim of the violence makes statements to the police, it is sometimes not
certain whether the defendant subsequently killed her to prevent her from testify'ing, to retaliate
against her for making statements, or in the course of another abusive incident).
45
1 See id at 2695-709 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
'Id at 2695-96.
47

1

Id at 2696.

1"Id
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indirect means" of keeping the witness from testifying, is a
far worse, direct one; and when a witness is "absent" due to
murder, the killer likely brought about that absence by his
"own wrongful procurement."14
In contrast to the majority, the dissenting Justices "found no case that
uses language that would not bring a murder and a subsequent trial
50
for murder within its scope."'1

Second, the dissenters cited the "forfeiture rule's basic purposes
and objectives," concluding that the maxim that "'no one shall be
permitted to take advantage of his own wrong"'. obviously applies to
murder.' 5 ' The dissent reasoned:
What more "evil practice," what greater "wrong," than to
murder the witness? And what greater evidentiary
"advantage" could one derive from that wrong than thereby to
prevent the witness from testifying, e.g., preventing the
witness from describing a history of physical abuse that is not
consistent with the defendant's claim that he killed her in

self-defense?

1 52

The dissent later reiterated this argument, highlighting the equities
of the situation:
[T]he majority's insistence upon a showing of purpose or
motive cannot be squared with the exception's basically
ethical objective. If H, by killing W, is able to keep W's
testimony out of court, then he has successfully "take[n]
advantage of his own wrong." And he does so whether he
killed herfor the purpose of keeping her from testifying, with
certain knowledge that she will not be able to testify, or with
a belief that rises to a reasonable level of probability. The
inequity consists of his being able to use the killing to keep
53
out of court her statements against him. 1

149Id at 2696-97 (quoting Lord Morley's Case, (1666) 6 How. St. Tr. 769, 771 (H.L.);
Harrison's Case, (1692) 12 How. St. Tr. 833, 868 (H.L.); Queen v. Scaife, (1851) 117 Eng. Rep.
1271, 1273 (Q.B.); Lord Fenwick's Case, (1696) 13 How. St. Tr. 537, 594 (H.C.); Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158 (1879)) (omission in original) (citations omitted).
150Id. at 2697 (emphasis added).
151Id. (quoting Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 159).
152Id

15

original).

d at 2699 (quoting Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 159) (citation omitted) (second alteration in
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Third, the dissent pointed to related areas of the law endorsing the
State's view. 154 The common law, for example, prohibits a life
insurance beneficiary who murders an insured from recovering under
the policy, and similarly prevents a will beneficiary who murders the

testator from collecting under that will. 55 In both situations, forfeiture
applies regardless of the murderer's purpose.'
Fourth, the dissenters argued that, even if the forfeiture doctrine
57
contains an intent requirement, Giles easily meets this requirement.1
According to the dissent, knowledge alone is sufficient to show the
requisite intent.15 To support this argument, the dissent cited an
opinion written by Justice Scalia' 59 for the established proposition that
"[a] "'man who performs an act which it is known will produce a
particular result is . . . presumed to have anticipated that result and to
have intended it.....
" 60 Stated differently, a person presumably intends
the natural and probable consequences of his acts. Here, Giles knew
that murdering his ex-girlfriend would prevent her from testifying; the
6
law therefore presumes he intended that result.'1 '
Perhaps most significantly, the dissent next argued that requiring
"proof of the defendant's purpose (rather than intent), as the majority
does, creates serious practical evidentiary problems" 62 caused by the
extremely difficult task of proving a person's subjective
motivations' 63 The dissent explained:
Consider H who assaults W, knows she has complained to the
police, and then murders her. H knows that W will be unable
154Id.

at 2697.

155Id
156Id.

1571d. at 2697-98 ("Tis is because the defendant here knew that murdering the
ex-girifriend would keep her from testit~ing; and that knowledge is sufficient to show the intent
that law ordinarily demands.").
158Id. at 2698.
1591d. (citing United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 613 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("[Tihe jury is entitled to presume that a person intends the natural and probable consequences
of his acts.")).
601d (quoting Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 496 (1896)).
161See id; cf. Richard D. Friedman, Grappling with the Meaning of "Testimonial," 71
BROOK. L. REv. 241, 25 1-53 (2005) (arguing that the term "testimonial" should be defned to
encompass "the transmittal of information for use in prosecution"; that this test should focus on
the frame of mind of the declarant at the time her out-of-court statement is made; and that
detennination of the declarant's intent should depend on whether the declarant understood that
there was a significant probability that her statement would be used in a later prosecution, rather
than a particular desire for that use).
2
16 Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2699 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
"63See generally Marc McAllister, What the High Court Giveth the Lower Courts Taketh
Away: How to Prevent Undue Scrutiny of Police Officer Motivations Without Eroding
Randolph's Heightened Fourth Amendment Protections, 56 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 663 (2008)
(analyzing similar difficulties in proving the subjective motivations of police).
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to testify against him at any future trial. But who knows
whether H's knowledge played a major role, a middling role,
a minor role, or no role at all, in H's decision to kill W? Who
knows precisely what passed through H's mind at the critical

moment? 16 4
According to the dissent, these practical evidentiary problems will
tend to create inequitable outcomes, a result which is particularly
ironic given the equitable nature of the forfeiture rule.165 For example,
under the majority's rule, the defendant who assaults his wife and
subsequently threatens her with harm if she testifies cannot benefit
from his wrong, whereas the defendant who assaults his wife and
166
subsequently murders her in a fit of rage can.
The final argument in Part II was that states should be free to
develop and apply their own evidentiary rules.' 6 7 However, by raising
the constitutional barrier of admission for such testimonial statements,
the majority's rule necessarily prevents the states from doing s0.1 68
In Part III of its opinion, the dissent argued (persuasively to
Justices Souter and Ginsburg) that the cases relied upon by the
majority do not, in fact, support the view that forfeiture is limited to
instances where the defendant intends to keep the witness from
testifying.16 9 According to the dissent, the common law cases instead
"suggest that the forfeiture rule would apply where the witness'
absence was the known consequence of the defendant's intentional
wrongful act" M0 -the argument that "procurement" implies purpose
or motive is unpersuasive. Citing the same dictionary relied upon by
the majority, the dissent reasoned that "[a]lthough a person may
'procure' a result purposefully, a person may also 'procure' a result
by causing it," or by "'bring[ing] [it] about,"' or ...effectling],"' all of
which "say nothing about motive or purpose."' 7 ' The same goes for
72
the majority's argument regarding the word "contrivance."'1

"64

Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2699 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

165Id.

("The inequity consists of [a person] being able to use the killing to keep out of
court her statements against him.").
166Id.

167Id.
6

at 2700.

1 8Id.
169Id. at

2698-702.
170 1d. at 2701 (citing Lord Morley's Case, (1666) 6 How. St. Tr. 769 (H.L.), Diaz v.
United States, 223 U.S. 442 (1912), and Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900), as
illustrative).
171Id. (citing 2 WEBSTER. supra note 104).
172Id. ("Even ifsa defendant had contrived, i.e., devised or planned, to murder a victim,
thereby keeping her away, it does not mean that he did so with the purpose of keeping her away
in mind.").
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Next, the dissent attacked the majority's inferences drawn from the
absence of common law murder cases in which the victim's Marian
statement was admitted on the ground the defendant had killed the
Victim. 173

The dissent found this omission unsurprising, explaining:

The most obvious reason why the majority cannot find an
instance where a court applied the rule of forfeiture at a
murder trial is that many (perhaps all) common-law courts
thought the rule of forfeiture irrelevant in such cases. In a
murder case, the relevant witness, the murder victim, was
dead; and historical legal authorities tell us that, when a
witness was dead, the common law admitted a Marian
statement.. .. Because the Marian statements of a deceased
witness were admissible simply by virtue of the witness'
death, there would have been no need to argue for their
74
admission pursuant to a forfeiture rule.'1
The dissent believed that a Marian statement could never be
admitted unless the defendant had a previous opportunity to confront
the witness. This meant that either of two situations occurred in a
murder trial where the witness was dead: (a) the Marian statement had
been properly confronted by the defendant, and it came into evidence
without the forfeiture exception; or (b) it was not confronted, and thus
would not have been admitted regardless.175 Because the forfeiture
exception was not implicated under a rule always requiring prior
confrontation, common law courts would have thought the forfeiture
76
exception irrelevant.1

According to the dissent, this same view explains the founding-era
dying declaration cases. The Giles majority argued that the parties did
not invoke forfeiture in dying declaration cases because admission
pursuant to the forfeiture exception required the difficult showing that
the defendant killed the witness with the purpose of securing the
absence of the witness at trial.'177 In contrast, the dissent believed that
the parties did not argue forfeiture in dying declaration cases because
the forfeiture exception permitted admission only of a properly taken
113Id

at 2702.

174M (citations omitted).
75

1

Id. at 2702-03.

176MIdat 2703. In support of this rationale, the dissent cited two cases relied upon by

the majority, King v. Woodcock and King v. Dingier, where the forfeiture rule was not
invoked-not because of the state of mind of the defendant when he committed his crime, but
rather because the victim's testimony was not a properly taken Marian statement. See id. (citing
King v. Woodcock, (1789) 168 Eng. Rep. 352; King v. Dingier, (1791) 168 Eng. Rep. 383).
1771d at 2688 (majority opinion).
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Marian deposition, and, where death was at issue, the forfeiture
exception was irrelevant.' According to the dissent:
[I]f the Marian deposition was proper, the rule of forfeiture
was unnecessary [because the statement was confronted]; if
the deposition was improper, the rule of forfeiture was
powerless to help. That is why we find lawyers in "dying
declaration" cases arguing that the dying declaration was
either a proper Marian deposition (in which case it was
admitted) or it was a "dying declaration" (in which case it
179
was admitted [as its own recognized exception]), or both.
Ultimately, the dissent concluded that "there are too few old
records available for us to draw firm conclusions. 1 80 Thus, "the Most
the majority might show is that the common law was not clear on
th[is] point."'18 ' With Justices Souter and Ginsburg in agreement with
this claim, 182 five of the nine Justices were ultimately unconvinced
183
that the historical record adequately resolved thle intent issue.
11. WHY GILEs WILL BE NARROWLY CONSTRUED

The narrow holding of Giles, requiring proof that the accused
intended to silence the would-be witness for forfeiture to apply, will
make it difficult for prosecutors to successfully invoke the forfeiture
doctrine. However, we should not expect prosecutors to abandon all
attempts to admit such disputed evidence, nor should we expect
courts to adhere strictly to the Giles rule. In this section, I highlight
7

18

Id at 2704 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

179

Id

181Id at 2705 ("[T]he majority's house of cards has no foundation; it is built on what is at
most common-law silence on the subject. The cases it cites tell us next to nothing about
of unconfronted statements.").
admission
82
1
See id. at 2694 (Souter, J., concurring).
183 Part IV of the dissent is written in rebuttal to the majority's response to its argument,
which is presented in Part II-D of the majority opinion. See id at 2705-08 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). For further illumination, the reader should review Part II-D-l of the majority
opinion, which responds to the dissent and argues that application of the common law wrongful
procurement rule did not depend on prior confrontation, as suggested by the dissent, but rather
on the purpose of the wrongful procurement. See id at 2688-91 (majority opinion) (disagreeing
with the dissent's interpretation of the historical record). In this Part, the majority argues that the
dissent's argument is essentially self-defeating, in that it argues that the common law forfeiture
rule was not applied unless the defendant had a previous opportunity to confront the witness
(which is not the case here in Giles). Id However, in Part IV of the dissent, Justice Breyer
now
clarifies that "modem courts have changed the ancient common-law forfeiture rule ..
admit[ting] unconfronted prior testimonial statements pursuant to such a rule.. .. [This] is a
fairly recent evidentiary development." Id. at 2706 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Note that Part 11-D-2
of the majority opinion was signed by only four Justices (Scalia, Roberts, Thomas, and Alito).
Id at 2680 (majority opinion).

20091

2009]WNBUT
~DONOT OUT41

417

several reasons why prosecutors and jurists will seek alternative
methods for admitting the type of evidence excluded in Giles, thereby
circumventing its holding.
The practical result of Giles will be to limit the instances where
forfeiture will be successfully invoked, 184 which will in turn decrease
the amount of evidence admitted at trial. Because some of this
excluded evidence would have assisted jurors in ascertaining the truth
(despite a lack of confrontation), at times the truth-seeking process
will be undermined by Giles's rule.185 As a result, courts will likely
narrow Giles's holding in those instances where the rule would cloud
the truth.
In Giles, for example, Brenda Avie's statements provided
significant circumstantial evidence as to whether the homicide, to
which no eyewitnesses were available, had been committed
unlawfully.186 Thus, excluding Avie's statements would effectively
permit the defendant to present a one-sided account of his relationship
with the victim, a result tending to diminish the jury's ability to assess
the truth.18 7 Given the Court's belief that "the 'Confrontation
Clause's very mission' . . . is to 'advance "the accuracy of the

truth-determining process in criminal trials,""', 188 this result is
particularly ironic.
Furthermore, in a post-Roberts world, Crawford's strict
cross-examination requirement makes it more difficult for prosecutors
to secure convictions, particularly for domestic abuse.' 89 To counter
184See State v. Romero, 133 P.3d 842, 854 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006) ("The prosecution will
surely be able to show that the defendant procured the witness's absence in more cases than it
will be able to show that the defendant did so with the specific intent of preventing the witness
from testifying."), aff'd, 156 P.3d 694 (N.M. 2007); see also Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2708 (Breyer,
J., dissenting) ("To insist upon a showing of purpose rather than plain (knowledge-based) intent
would limit the amount of unconfronted evidence that the jury might hear.").
15 See supra notes 80-87 and accompanying text (describing a similar sentiment
underlying the California Supreme Court's opinion in Giles).
186Respondent's Brief on the Merits, supra note 25, at 11-12.
187Indeed, eliminating untested evidentiary accounts is the very driving force behind
adoption of the Confrontation Clause. See Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414-15 (1985)
(noting that "[tlhe Clause's fundamental role i[s] protecting the right of cross-examination," and
declaring that, without the ability to present rebuttal evidence, "the jury would have been
impeded in its task of evaluating the truth of respondent's testimony" -"a result [that] would
have been at odds with the Confrontation Clause's very mission").
'8sUnited States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 396 (1986) (quoting Street, 471 U.S. at 415); see
also United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 653 (2d Cir. 2001) ("Adoption of Dhinsa's
proposed limitation [of the waiver by wrongdoing doctrine] would limit the proof against
him-the very result that the waiver-by-misconduct doctrine seeks to remedy."). But see
Friedman, supra note 26, at 1028 (1998) ("Truth-determination is itself a poor criterion for
deterining applicability of the confrontation right. That is. whether or not admissibility of the
challenged statement would assist truth-determination should not be determinative of whether
admissibility violates the confrontation right.").
119See Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747, 750
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this unfortunate effect, a robust forfeiture doctrine is needed in cases
where juries would benefit from the evidence but where Crawford
would bar its admission.' 90 In fact, between 2004 and 2008 courts
often reacted to Crawford by favoring a broader forfeiture doctrine
than that permitted by Giles. After Crawford, many jurisdictions
either adopted the forfeiture doctrine if they had not done so before,
or expanded the doctrine' 9 1 to encompass more testimonial
statements.192 Many of these courts expanded the doctrine out of a
perceived necessity for it. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, for
example, declared "that in a post-Crawford world the broad view of
forfeiture. ...
is essential."' The California Supreme Court similarly
opined that post-Crawfordcourts "should be able to [invoke forfeiture
to] further the truth-seeking function of the adversary process when
necessary, allowing fact finders access to relevant evidence that the
94
defendant caused not to be available through live testimony."'
Despite the narrow holding of Giles, prosecutors and jurists
concerned with truth-determination should continue to advance this
sentiment post-Giles.
A second flaw in the Giles rule is that it creates incentives to
silence would-be witnesses. According to confrontation expert,
Professor Richard D. Friedman, where the "victim made a testimonial
statement against the accused before the final assault and the accused
was . .. aware of that fact - denying forfeiture absent a showing of
purpose to render the witness unavailable would create a horribly

(2005) (reporting that 63 percent of survey respondents from over sixty prosecutors' offices
concluded that Crawford significantly impeded prosecutions of domestic violence, and that 65
percent reported that victims of domestic violence are less safe in their jurisdictions as a result
of Crawford).
1
9OSee, e.g., id. at 808 (arguing that Crawford increased the likelihood that domestic
abusers will threaten their victims before trial to derail the prosecution, and concluding that
"[tlhe doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing would help to prevent abusers from manipulating
witnesses"); see also Brief of Richard D. Friedman as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petition for
Certiorari at 2, Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008) (No. 07-6053), 2007 WL 4231058
("In Crawford. .,this Court demolished the old framework of doctrine of the Confrontation
Clause and began construction of a radically different one. A central and integral component of
confrontation doctrine is the principle that the accused may forfeit the confrontation right if his
wrongful conduct renders the witness unavailable. Accordingly, the Court cannot build the new
confrontation fr-amework soundly without developing a carefully considered conception of
forfeiture.").
191See, e.g., United States v. Garcia-Meza, 403 F.3d 364, 370-71 (6th Cir. 2005) (applying
forfeiture doctrine in murder case with facts very similar to Giles); State v. Jensen, 727 N.W.2d
518, 533 (Wis. 2007) (applying forfeiture doctrine in murder case and citing Garcia-Meza).
192
Jensen, 727 N.W.2d at 533.
193Id. at

53 5.

v. Giles, 152 P.3d 433, 444 (Cal. 2007), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 976 (2008),
vacated, 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008).
194People
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perverse incentive, to 'finish the job' and make the assault a fatal
one." 195 In such cases, the accused often has multiple motivations for
the assault, and evidence of a specific intent to prevent the victim
from testify'ing is often slim, rendering the victim's prior statements
196
inadmissible under Giles.

One can easily imagine scenarios where the Giles rule would, in
fact, shield blatant wrongdoers. Take, for example, a defendant who
decides to murder his wife. For several months, this defendant
carefully crafts his plan to perfection. One week before the murder,
the couple gets into a heated argument. Knowing his murder plan is
nearly flawless, and feeling somewhat boastful at the time, the
defendant lets loose his intentions, stating, "none of this matters
anyway because by next Tuesday night you will be dead from the
poison." Startled by this admission, the wife calls the police, reports
the incident, and states that she has reason to believe her husband will
kill her next Tuesday; moreover, that he will do so by poisoning her.
Unbeknownst to the wife, the defendant overhears this conversation.
Still motivated by an overwhelming desire to kill his wife (i.e., not
a desire to prevent her from testifyuing), the defendant decides the best
thing to do would be to complete the job. And so, the following
Tuesday night, just as he warned, the defendant executes his murder
by poisoning his wife. With no witnesses and not much physical
evidence, the prosecutor wishes to introduce the victim's statement in
which the victim accurately predicted both the time and the manner of
her death. This evidence, it would seem, would have a big impact on
the jury. However, under Giles it would be very difficult to prove the
killing was specifically intended to prevent the victim from testify'ing.
This is particularly true here because the defendant had been planning
his crime for months, which indicates that silencing his victim due to
her report was not his true motivation. The defendant was going to
kill his wife regardless, and her police report only solidified his plan.
As applied to my hypothetical defendant, the Giles rule has, at the
front end, created a perverse incentive to "finish the job." This is
ironic and self-defeating, given that "the primary reasoning behind
[the forfeiture] rule is . . . to deter criminals from intimidating or
'taking care of potential witnesses against them."197 In addition, at
the back end, the Giles rule would prevent jurors from hearing the one
piece of evidence that might resolve their doubt as to the defendant's
195Brief of Richard D. Friedman as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 8 n.5,
Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008) (No. 07-6053), 2008 WL 859395.
96
1 See id.
197United States v. Thompson, 286 F.3d 950, 962 (7th Cir. 2002); see also People v.
Geraci, 649 N.E.2d 817, 821 (N.Y. 1995) (also noting public policy motivations).
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guilt. While a work of fiction, the above hypothetical is not so
convoluted that it is unlikely to occur. This hypothetical is, for
98
example, quite similar to State v. Jensen.'
A third reason to expect a limiting of Giles is that its rule may
often lead to inequitable inconsistencies. 99 Under the Giles rule, the
more heinous the act of silencing, the more likely the evidence will be
excluded. For example, a defendant who successfully detains a
potential witness by bribing her would forfeit his confrontation right,
whereas the defendant who kills his victim would not. All things
being equal, the killer would have a better chance of acquittal than
would the petty briber. This result seems wrong. If the Court is
willing to permit a defendant's wrongdoing to override his
confrontation right (as indicated by Crawford, Davis, and Giles), the
Court should do so in cases of intentional killings. 0 Murder, after all,
20
"falls in the worst class of wrongdoing and 'unclean hands. " '
Despite the specific intent required by Giles, courts will continue
to believe that a defendant, regardless of his particular intent, should
not be permitted to insist upon the very legal protections his wrongful
acts have made impossible. 202 As one court recently put it:
[I]f the forfeiture rule is to further the maxim that "no one
shall be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong," then
the motivation for the wrongdoing must be deemed irrelevant.
Whether a murder is motivated by a desire to silence a

198
727 N.W.2d 518 (Wis. 2007) (noting possible application of the forfeiture exception to
defendant's intentional homicide of his wife, who died of poisoning, where during the weeks
prior to her death, defendant's wife repeatedly voiced her fear that defendant was trying to
poison her; in a post-Crawfordworld, the court determined that some of victim's out-of-court
statements were inadmissible under Crawford, but that the forfeiture exception would
extinguish defendant's confrontation rights if, on remand, the prosecutor could prove by a
preponderance of evidence that the accused caused the witness's absence).
199See Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2699 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
200RepnetsBrief on the Merits, supra note 25, at 16.
201

Id. at 13.

202See, e.g., State v. Romero, 156 P.3d 694, 703 (N.M. 2007) (Bosson, J., concurring in

part and dissenting in part) ("Whether [defendant] caused [his wife's] absence with the specific
intent to prevent his wife from testifying, or whether he caused that absence simply in a drunken
rage, the effect is the same. The witness cannot speak for herself because she is dead at
[defendant]'s hands. It seems a perversion of the Constitution and the Confrontation Clause to
allow any defendant to profit so from his own misdeeds."); see also Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2709
(2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Regardless of a defendant's purpose, threats, further violence,
and ultimately murder, can stop victims from testifying."); Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193,
1202 (6th Cir. 1982) (arguing that a defendant cannot demand live testimony over out-of-court
statements by creating the condition that prevents it); Respondent's Brief on the Merits. supra
note 25, at 15 (arguing that regardless of the defendant's specific motive, the damage inflicted
on the trial's truth-seeking fuanction by the loss of the evidence in any particular case, and its
one-sided replacement, remains the same).
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witness, financial gain, or mere sadism, the murderer should
not be permitted to gain an advantage. 0
While the above argument was largely rejected in Giles, the inequities
that would flow from a strict interpretation of the Giles rule remain,
and one can expect courts to shy away from inequitable results.
The fourth reason jurists will seek to circumvent Giles is the
extreme difficulty prosecutors will face in meeting its literal
requirements, in part due to the difficult task of proving actual intent.
The Giles holding ignores the reality0 that those facing potential
criminal charges sometimes do murder potential witnesses to prevent
their testimony in future court proceedings, 205 but that evidence of
such a purpose is extremely difficult to gamner. Although it is hard to
quantify exactly how often a defendant kills with the requisite Giles
intent without leaving behind the evidence needed to prove that
intent, the difficulties inherent in proving subjective motives are
206
bound to create substantial evidentiary obstacles.
The fifth reason to expect jurists to narrowly construe Giles
concerns the special problems of proof inherent in the domestic abuse
context. A byproduct of the shift from Roberts to Crawford has been
to curtail the ability of prosecutors to secure convictions in domestic
abuse cases.20 One recent commentator, for example, reported that 63
percent of survey respondents from over sixty prosecutors' offices felt
that Crawford significantly impeded prosecutions of domestic
violence, and 65 percent reported that victims of domestic violence
are less safe as a result of Crawford.0 This is no trivial concern.
Each year, domestic violence results in more than 2 million injuries
and leads to 1,500 deaths, and it is difficult to prove because the
victim is generally reluctant or unable to testify.20
203People v. Ruiz, No. H026609, 2005 WL 1670426, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. July 19, 2005)
(citation omitted).
2 04
According to the Giles majority, "[i]n cases where the evidence suggested that the
defendant had caused a person to be absent, but had not done so to prevent the person from
testif3ing-as in the typical murder case involving accusatorial statements by the victim--the
testimony was excluded unless it was confronted or fell within the dying declaration exception."
Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2684 (emphasis added). While nearly impossible to prove, I doubt that the
"typical murder" of a potential witness of some prior crime does not often involve at least a
partial motive to quiet the witness.
203See, e.g., United States v. Emery, 186 F.3d 921, 925 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding substantial
proof that a would-be witness against a defendant on drug-related charges was cooperating with
federal authorities, that defendant was aware of such cooperation, that defendant participated in
killing the would-be witness, and that part of defendant's motivation for killing her was to stop
her from
cooperating with authorities).
2
06See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
207
See Lininger, supra note 189, at 750.
2

09See id. at 751, 768-71 (explaining why domestic abuse victims are often reluctant to
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As noted by Justice Breyer 2 10 and essentially ratified by the
majority, 211 "the rule of forfeiture is implicated primarily where
domestic abuse is at issue."2 12 As applied to the domestic abuse arena,
a constitutional evidentiary requirement that requires a showing of
purpose rather than probabilistic knowledge, as does the Giles rule,
may permit the person who threatened or murdered the declarant to
'' avoid conviction for earlier crimes by taking advantage of later
ones." 213 As Justice Breyer argues, such a rule threatens to break the
promise of Davis:
In Davis, we recognized that "domestic violence" cases
are "notoriously susceptible to intimidation or coercion of the
victim to ensure that she does not testify at trial." We noted
the concern that "[w]hen this occurs, the Confrontation
Clause gives the criminal a windfall." And we replied to that
concern by stating that "one who obtains the absence of a
witness by wrongdoing forfeits the constitutional right to
confrontation." To the extent that it insists upon an additional
showing of purpose, the Court breaks the promise implicit in
those words and, in doing so, grants the defendant not fair
2 14
treatment, but a windfall.
Cracks in the foundation of the majority's logic provide a sixth
reason to expect a narrowing of Giles. While much of the majority
opinion is devoted to proving the existence of its rule at common law,
a majority of Justices concluded that the historical record simply did
not resolve the issue. Justices Souter and Ginsburg, who joined the
majority opinion but wrote a separate concurrence, were admittedly
unpersuaded, concluding that "the early cases on the exception were
not calibrated finely enough to answer the narrow question here." t
Once one concedes that the historical record does not resolve the
precise question in Giles, the equitable nature of the rule takes on
added significance. The problem here is that all of the Court's prior

testify against their abuser, and noting how frequently abuse victims recant).
210
See Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2708-09 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
2 11
See id at 2693 (majority opinion) (noting the role of domestic violence in dissuading
victims
from
seeking outside help and preventing cooperation with authorities).
212
See id at 2708 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Lininger, supra note 189, at 768
("[Domestic violence] cases are more likely than others to rely on hearsay statements by
accusers who may recant or refuse to cooperate with the prosecution at the time of trial...
Recent evidence suggests 80 to 85 percent of battered women will recant at some point.").
213 Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2708-09 (Breyer, J1.,
dissenting).
214 Id. at 2709 (citations omitted) (alteration in original).
215 Id at 2694 (Souter, J., concurring).
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statements-including statements made mere months prior to this
decision-caused many courts to conclude that the forfeiture doctrine
should be interpreted much more broadly. 1 A plain reading of
Reynolds certainly appears to support this view. Indeed, Reynolds
appears to sanction an open-ended exception for all would-be
witnesses who are dead at the time of trial.21 In 1878, the Reynolds
Court declared:
The constitutional right of a prisoner to confront the witness
and cross-examine him is not to be abrogated, unless it be
shown that the witness is dead, or out of the jurisdiction of
the court; or that, having been summoned, he appears to have
been kept away by the adverse party on the trial.2 1
The Reynolds Court does not differentiate between different types
of deceased witnesses in this passage. Further, if we examine the
actual Reynolds passage interpreted by the Giles Court, the dissent
again appears to have the stronger argument. Recall that the Reynolds
Court described the forfeiture doctrine in this manner:
The Constitution gives the accused the right to a trial at
which he should be confronted with the witnesses against
him; but if a witness is absent by [the accused's] own
wrongful procurement, he cannot complain if competent
evidence is admitted to supply the place of that which he has
kept away. The Constitution does not guarantee an accused
person against the legitimate consequences of his own
wrongful acts. It grants him the privilege of being confronted
with the witnesses against him; but if he voluntarily keeps the
witnesses away, he cannot insist on his privilege. 1

216See, e.g., United States v. Garcia-Meza, 403 F.3d 364, 370-71 (6th Cir. 2005) ("The
Supreme Court's recent affirmation of the 'essentially equitable grounds' for the rule of
forfeiture strongly suggests that the rule's applicability does not hinge on the wrongdoer's
motive. The Defendant, regardless of whether he intended to prevent the witness from testifying
against hinm or not, would benefit through his own wrongdoing if such a witness's statements
could not be used against him, which the rule of forfeiture, based on principles of equity, does
not permit.").
217
See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 151-52 (1878).
218Id (first emphasis added).
219M.d at 158.
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Although Justice Scalia is an admitted textualist 22 0 he was not
persuaded by the fact that the Reynolds Court's analysis simply does
not contain an "intent" requirement .2 2 '1The closest the Reynolds Court
comes to such a requirement is the assertion that if an accused
"'voluntarily keeps the witnesses away,"' he cannot invoke his right
to confront those witnesses. 2 However, by its terms, "'voluntarily
keep[ing] [a] witness[] away"'. would naturally include voluntarily
killing that witness for any reason, such that the witness is unable to
attend future court proceedings. 2
Finally, and perhaps most troubling, the Giles rule creates a logical
disconnect between the two major confrontation exceptions ratified
by the Crawford Court, forfeiture by wrongdoing and the dying
declaration. 2 Because dying declarations are routinely admitted in
murder trials without opportunity for confrontation and absent proof
of witness tampering, they bear a striking resemblance to the

statements admitted against

Giles. 2 25

If dying declarations are

admissible without having to prove intent-to-silence, while similar
declarations made in the absence of impending death are not, the
Court should provide a principled basis for this constitutional
however, does not do so.
distinction. 26Giles,
220
See Gregory Bassham, Justice Scalia's Equitable Constitution, 33 J.C. & U.L. 143, 143
(2006) ("Scalia himself has claimed that '[wihat I look for in the Constitution is precisely what I
look for in a statute: the original meaning of the text, not what the original draftsmen intended."'
(quoting Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATT'ER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 38 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997)) (alteration in original)); see
also Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a
Fact-FindingModel of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REv. 1295, 1296 (1990).
221See, e.g., State v. Romero, 133 P.3d 842, 853 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006) ("[W]e do not
believe that Reynolds says anything about whether the intent to silence requirement is required
by the constitution."), affid, 156 P.3d 694 (N.M. 2007).
222
Joshua Deahl, Note, Expanding Forfeiture Without Sacrificing Confrontation After
Crawford, 104 MICH. L. REv. 599, 608 (2005) (quoting Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 158).
223
1d. (quoting Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 158) ("[T]he [Reynolds] Court never undertook any
consideration of Reynolds' purpose, apparently indifferent to the motivations underlying his
obstructionism.").
224Th dying declaration would typically permit the introduction of unconfronted
statements where the witness was under the apprehension of death at the time she made the
damaging
statements. See Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2685 (2008).
225
See Respondent's Brief on the Merits, supra note 25, at 13.
226Tebest justification we have is simply that the dying declaration exception was around
at the time of the Founding, and a constitutional right is to be interpreted in accordance with the
law that existed when the right was adopted. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.6
(2004) ("If [the dying declaration] exception must be accepted on historical grounds, it is sui
generis."); see also Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895) ("[Tjhere could be
nothing more directly contrary to the letter of the [Confrontation Clause] than the admission of
dying declarations. They are rarely made in the presence of the accused, they are made without
any opportunity for examination or cross-examination, . . . yet from time immemorial they have
been treated as competent testimony. .. )
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The specific intent required by Giles is similarly inconsistent with
analogous criminal law forfeiture rules. For example, under the law of
self-defense, courts have ruled that initial aggressors lose the
protections of self-defense. 2 According to some courts, this rule
applies even where the initial aggressor does not intend consequences
as severe as death or serious injury; to these courts, the aggressor's

generally wrongful acts are enough to forfeit his self-defense

claim. 228

The Model Penal Code's justification, or choice-of-evils, defense
contains a similar forfeiture restriction. Under this provision, when an
actor recklessly or negligently brings about the situation that creates
the actor's choice, the actor may not then invoke the choice-of-evils

defense. 229

By analogy, being an equitable doctrine grounded in general
notions of culpability (such as the broadly-phrased maxim that no one
shall be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong), the forfeiture
exception should only require similar evidence of general
wrongdoing. As was implicit in the California Court of Appeal's
ruling, 230 a defendant's general wrongful intent directed toward the
would-be witness should suffice.2 3 In short, an equitable doctrine
grounded in very general notions of culpability should be triggered by
similarly general evidence of ill intent.

111. THE POTENTIAL NARROWING OF GILES
With courts now unable to apply the forfeiture doctrine in future
cases where the equities demand it but where intent evidence is
scarce, this Part examines the two primary methods by which lower
227 Where a defendant responds to an attack upon his life with deadly force, the defendant
loses the right to claim self-defense if he initially provoked the incident. See, e.g., United States
v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1223 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("The right of homicidal self-defense is
granted only to those free from fault in the difficulty; it is denied to slayers who incite the fatal
attack, encourage the fatal quarrel or otherwise promote the necessitous occasion for taking
life."); id at 1237 ("The right of self-defense ... cannot be claimed by the aggressor in an
affr~ay so long as he retains that unmitigated role, It logically follows that any rule of no-retreat
which may protect an innocent victim of the affray would, like other incidents of a forfeited
right of self-defense, be unavailable to the party who provokes or stimulates the conflict.").
8
n See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 cmt. (1985) ("This conclusion [adopted by the Model
Penal Code]-that an initial aggressor is accountable for his original unlawful use of force but
not for his defense against a disproportionate return of force by his victim-is surely not
unreasonable on its face. There is, however, much authority, both common law and statutory,
demanding that a person claiming self-defense be free from fault in bringing on the difficulty.").
229
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(2). Note that this restriction only applies in a
prosecution for any offense for which recklessness or negligence suffices to establish
culpability.

230

See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
supra notes 157-161 and accompanying text (describing a similar argument

231See

advanced by Justice Breyer).
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courts will avoid Giles's grasp, thereby achieving what some courts
will deem an equitable result: (a) easing prosecutors' burden of
proving the intent required by Giles; and (b) broadening the definition
of "non-testimonial."
A. Evading Giles through Proofof the Requisite Intent
While Crawford and Davis conceded that forfeiture could trump
confrontation rights when properly proven, these decisions did not
resolve exactly what quantum of evidence is required to trigger a
finding of forfeiture. 3 Giles similarly did not address the manner in
which its requisite intent must be proven. Neither did these decisions
resolve critical procedural questions, such as the applicable burden of
proof, nor whether wrongdoing may be established by the very
unconfronted statements sought to be admitted. 3 These are
significant constitutional questions that remain open after Giles.2 3
In this section, I examine six methods by which lower courts
post-Giles could make it easier for prosecutors to prove the intent
required by Giles. These methods include: (1) lowering the burden of
proof from clear and convincing to preponderance of the evidence;
(2) inferring intent from circumstantial evidence, including evidence
from prior incidents not involving the would-be witness; (3)
transferring intent from one wrongdoer to another under complicity
principles; (4) shifting the burden of proof from prosecution to
defense; (5) permitting use of the disputed hearsay in the very hearing
used for determining the requisite intent; and (6) requiring only
evidence of a partial intent to silence the would-be witness.
1. Lowering Burden ofProof
Most state and federal courts that have considered forfeiture claims
have applied a preponderance standard when determining whether
the requisite intent exists. 2 11 On the strength of this precedent,
232See People v. Giles, 152 P.3d 433, 448 n.1I (Cal. 2007) (Werdegar, J., concurring), cert.
granted,
128 S. Ct. 976 (2008), vacated, 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008).
233

See id at 448n.lI & 2.
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 833 (2006) (suggesting, but not deciding, that
if a hearing on forfeiture is required, hearsay evidence-including the unavailable witness's
out-of-court statements-may be considered in deciding whether the accused forfeited his
confrontation rights).
235
See Vasquez v. People, 173 P.3d 1099, 1105 (Colo. 2007) (en banc); see also United
States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 820 (10th Cir. 2000) (noting that Confrontation Clause rights
may be waived if specific criteria are established through a preponderance of the evidence);
United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1280 (1st Cit. 1996) (discussing basis for selecting
preponderance standard over clear and convincing standard); United States v. Mastrangelo, 693
F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1982) ("We see no reason to impose upon the government more than the
234See
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Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6) also utilizes the preponderance
standard. 3 However, some courts have applied the far more
demanding clear and convincing standard .23 ' Because the United
States Supreme Court has yet to resolve this issue, 3 lower courts
post-Giles are free to adopt whichever standard they prefer.
United States v. Mastrangelo,3 in which the prosecution's key
witness was killed while on his way to court to testify,2" 0 illustrates
how a court's selection of the governing standard can dictate its
resolution of the forfeiture claim.24 Mastrangelo is particularly
helpful to the instant analysis, as it applied each standard in the same
case, reaching opposite outcomes.
In Mastrangelo, the defendant was charged along with eleven
co-defendants with crimes stemming from the importation of large
amounts of marijuana and methaqualone tablets.24 The only evidence
connecting Mastrangelo to the drug conspiracy was evidence of his
purchase of four trucks seized by federal agents while loaded with the

usual burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence where waiver by misconduct is
concerned."); United States v. Mayhew, 380 F. Supp. 2d 961, 968 (S.D. Ohio 2005)
("[E]quitable considerations demand that a defendant forfeits his Confrontation Clause rights if
the court determines by a preponderance of the evidence that the declarant is unable to testify
because the defendant intentionally murdered her, regardless of whether the defendant is
standing trial for the identical crime that caused the declarant's unavailability."); State v.
Gettings, 769 P.2d 25, 29 (Kan. 1989) (holding that the burden of proving that the
defendant procured the absence of the witness is upon the State by a preponderance of the
evidence); Commonwealth v. Edwards, 830 N.E.2d 158, 172 (Mass. 2005) (discussing that the
issue of the standard of proof has been considered and that a preponderance standard is
required).
236
See FED. R. EVID. 804, Notes of Advisory Conmmittee on Rules, 1997 Amendments.
237See. e.g., United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 631 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (applying
the clear and convincing standard). The preponderance of the evidence standard equates to a
mere finding of "more probable than not." The preponderance standard "simply requires the
trier of fact 'to believe that the existence of a fact is more probable than its nonexistence before
[he] may find in favor of the party who has the burden to persuade the [judge] of the fact's
existence."' In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371-72 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (quoting F.
JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 250-51 (1965)). By contrast, the clear and convincing standard
requires a distinctly higher degree of certainty than the preponderance standard. See United
States v. Mastrangelo, 561 F. Supp. 1114, 1120 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), afi'd, 722 F.2d 13 (2d Cir.
1983); see also Hobson v. Eaton, 399 F.2d 781, 784 n.2 (6th Cir. 1968); 30 Am. JUR. 2D
Evidence
§ 1167 (1964).
238
See Davis, 547 U.S. at 833 ("We take no position on the standards necessary to
demonstrate such forfeiture, but federal [and state] courts using Federal Rule of Evidence
804(b)(6), which codifies the forfeiture doctrine, have generally held the Government to the
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.").
239693 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1982).
240Id. at 271, 273-74 (remanding for evidentiary hearing on the defendant's involvement
in death of a witness who was killed on his way to court to testify against defendant).
241 Id.
42

2

1d. at

270.
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drugs.2 4 The sole witness to Mastrangelo's purchase of the trucks,
James Bennett, was murdered. 2
In April 1979, Bennett testified before a grand jury that he sold
Mastrangelo the trucks under suspicious circumstances .2 45 He also
identified a tape recording of a conversation with Mastrangelo, in
which Mastrangelo made threatening statements to Bennett seemingly
intended to deter Bennett from identifying Mastrangelo as the
purchaser. 4 Two years later, Bennett was shot dead in the street
while on his way to court to testify in Mastrangelo's trial.2 4 The trial
judge declared a mistrial as to Mastrangelo, and the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed. 4
Prior to the start of Mastrangelo's second trial, the Government
moved for admission of Bennett's grand jury testimony pursuant to
the residual exception to the hearsay rule set forth in Federal Rule of
Evidence 804(b)(5). Invoking the Confrontation Clause, Mastrangelo
opposed the motion .249 The trial judge admitted the evidence,
reasoning that Mastrangelo was implicated in Bennett's murder and
had therefore waived his confrontation right.2 10 On the strength of
Bennett's grand july testimony, Mastrangelo was convicted of various
drug related charges, 25 1 and was sentenced to nine years

imprisonment. 2

52

Mastrangelo then appealed the admission of Bennett's grand jury
253
a254
testimony.
After afrming the rule of waiver by misconduct, 5
the Second Circuit remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the
issue of whether Mastrangelo was, in fact, involved in Bennett's
murder .25 5 Before remanding, the Second Circuit provided guidance
256
Adopting a rather liberal method of proving
on this determination.
intent-to-silence, the court declared that if Mastrangelo "was in fact
involved in the death of [the witness] through knowledge, complicity,
planning or in any other way, [the trial court] must hold his objections
243Id. at
244Id.
245

2

27 1.

Id.

id (setting forth relevant portions of recording).
Id.
248Id. at 271-72.
46See

2A47

24

I at 272.

250OId.
251United States v. Mastrangelo, 561 F. Supp. 1114, 1115 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 722
F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1983).
252 Id.
253
Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d at 270.
254
See id. at 272-73 (citing cases applying the waiver by misconduct doctrine).
255Id at 273-74.
256See United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 818 ("United States v. Mastrangeloadopted
a broad definition of imputed waiver." (citation omitted)).
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to the use of [the witness's] testimony waived." 257 The Second Circuit
ruled that "bare knowledge of the plot" plus a "failure to warn"
authorities alone would sufficiently implicate Mastrangelo, 5 and that
proof of such "bare knowledge" need only be shown by a
preponderance of the evidence .259 With these guidelines in place, the
Second Circuit then took the unusual step of requesting the lower
court's analysis of Mastrangelo's involvement under both the clear
and convincing and preponderance of the evidence standards. 6
On remand, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York found the evidence sufficient, under the
preponderance standard, to find that Mastrangelo had prior
knowledge of the murder plot and failed to warn appropriate
authorities .26 1 The court reached the opposite outcome under the clear
and convincing standard. 6
At the evidentiary hearing, the court heard testimony from three
individuals: (1) Joseph Bennett, the nephew of the murdered witness
who was a participant in the federal witness protection program and
who had a substantial criminal record; (2) Nicholas Berardi, who met
Mastrangelo in prison, and was also a participant in the federal
witness protection program with a substantial criminal record; and
(3) Assistant United States Attorney Walter Mack, who testified as to
his prior interview of Berardi. 6
In essence, Joseph Bennett testified that, in a meeting with
the defendant, Mastrangelo relayed his concern that James Bennett
would testify against him, and that Mastrangelo seemed determined to

25 7
25

Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d at 273.
See id at 273-74 ("Bare knowledge of a plot to kill [the witness] and a failure to give

warning to appropriate authorities is sufficient to constitute a waiver.").
25 Id at 273. In justifying its selection of the preponderance standard, the Mastrangelo
court reasoned:
We see no reason to impose upon the government more than the usual burden of
proof by a preponderance of the evidence where waiver by misconduct is concerned.
Such a claim of waiver is not one which is either unusually subject to deception or
disfavored by the law. To the contrary, such misconduct is invariably accompanied
by tangible evidence such as the disappearance of the defendant, disruption in the
courtroom or the murder of a key witness, and there is hardly any reason to apply a
burden of proof which might encourage behavior which strikes at the heart of the
system of justice itself.
omitted).
Id (citation
2601d. at 274.
261United States v. Mastrangelo, 561 F. Supp. 1114, 1115 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), affd, 722
F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1983).
262 Id
263Id
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prevent James Bennett from taking the stand, although he did not
2
divulge any particular plan to do So. 64
Nicholas Berardi testified that, according to Mastrangelo, the
elimination of Bennett was "a necessity. 26 5 Berardi, however, also
testified that, when interviewed by Walter Mack, he informed Mack
that Mastrangelo did not know about the murder, and that
Mastrangelo may have learned of the phone call after the killing. 6
Because Mack's interview notes seemed to confirm Berardi's
latter statements and indicated that Mastrangelo did not know the
murder was going to occur, Mack testified that the report "'did not
comport with [his] recollection of what had been said" ,2 67 According
to Mack, his notes were to be read not to indicate that Mastrangelo
was unaware of the murder, but rather that Mastrangelo was unaware
of its precise details. 6
The trial court found the testimony of Bennett and Berardi
"generally credible," but cautioned that both witnesses had substantial
criminal records along with "possible motivations for perjury." 26 9
Thus, the court concluded that, although no direct evidence was
adduced to establish Mastrangelo's prior knowledge of the murder
plot, there was sufficient "circumstantial evidence from which the
inference of prior knowledge may be drawn." 270 Accordingly, the
court held that Mastrangelo had waived his confrontation objection
through his own wrongdoing under the preponderance standard .2 7 '1
Following the Court of Appeals' mandate, the court then analyzed
the forfeiture issue under the more stringent clear and convincing
evidence standard. 7 Noting that the clear and convincing standard
requires witnesses to "'.distinctly remember[]"'. the details of their
testimony and to narrate those details "'.exactly and in due order,' the
court concluded that the testimony of Bennett and Berardi, although
sufficient to support a probability-based finding of prior knowledge,
lacked the specificity and precision demanded by the clear and
convincing standard. 7 Thus, the court would have reached the
opposite outcome under this standard.

264Id.

at 1116 (summarizing the testimony of Joseph Bennett).

265Id. at I1117.
26
6See id. at 1116-18 (summarizing the testimony of Nicholas Berardi).
267Id. at 1118-19 (quoting and summarizing the testimony of Walter Mack).

26

8Id

at 1119.
270Id
271Id. at 1120.
269Id.

272

1Id

27
3 Id.

(quoting 30 Am. JUR. 2D Evidence § 1167 (1964)).
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As Mastrangelo illustrates, a court's selection of the governing
standard, as well as the court's view of the type of evidence sufficient
to establish intent, may dictate the court's resolution of the forfeiture
claim. This is particularly true in conspiracy-related cases, where
witnesses such as Bennett and Berardi are not always considered
credible.
2. Inferring Intent
In some pre-Giles cases, the requisite intent-to-silence is simply
inferred from circumstantial evidence. The Mastrangelo court, for
example, relied upon circumstantial evidence to infer the defendant's
intent to silence a key government witness. 7 The New Mexico
Supreme Court has also ratified the practice of inferring intent, stating
that "in some cases, a trial court could simply 'infer' from the
evidence presented to it that the defendant intended by his misconduct
to prevent the witness from testifying. 7 Inferring intent makes it
easier for prosecutors to satisfy Giles by eliminating the need to prove
actual intent.
In the domestic abuse context, Giles indicates both that intent
evidence may be inferred and that such evidence may include distant,
unrelated interactions between the accused and the would-be
witness. 276 In Giles, Justices Souter and Ginsburg argued in
concurrence that "the element of intention would normally be
satisfied by the intent inferred on the part of the domestic abuser in
the classic abusive relationship. 7 Justice Scalia's majority opinion,

274I.at

1119 (emphasis added).
v. Romero, 133 P.3d 842, 855 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006), aff'd, 156 P.3d 694 (N.M.
2007). The Romero court cited United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635 (2d Cir. 2001), and United
States v. Mller, 116 F.3d 641 (2d Cir. 1997). See Romero, 133 P.3d at 854. In Dhinsa, the court
upheld, under harmless error analysis, the trial court's application of forfeiture doctrine to the
defendant, who was head of a "vast racketeering organization" and was convicted of numerous
counts of killing and threatening people who cooperated with police; rather than seeking
specific intent evidence, the court simply reviewed the "direct and overwhelming evidence" of
Dhinsa's participation in the murders. 243 F.3d at 643, 656-58, 660. In Miller, the court applied
forfeiture doctrine to a group of defendants involved in "a RICO enterprise conducted through a
campaign of violent enforcement and retribution." 116 F.3d at 652, 667-69. See also State v.
Alvarez-Lopez, 98 P.3d 699, 705 (N.M. 2004) ("It may he sufficient to infer under certain facts
that a defendant intended by his misconduct to prevent the witness from testifying. For example,
we may be able to infer a criminal defendant's murder of a key prosecution witness was
intended to prevent the witness from testifying at the defendant's trial.").
276Justice Breyer interpreted this passage in a similar manner, declaring that "the majority
...
ends its opinion by creating a kind of presumption that will transform purpose into
knowledge-based intent-atleast where domestic violence is at issue; and that is the area where
the problem is most likely to arise." Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2708 (2008) (Breyer,
J., dissenting).
277Id. at 2695 (Souter, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
275 State
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joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Alito, made a similar claim. The majority explained:
Acts of domestic violence often are intended to dissuade a
victim from resorting to outside help, and include conduct
designed to prevent testimony to police officers or
cooperation in criminal prosecutions. Where such an abusive
relationship culminates in murder, the evidence may support
a finding that the crime expressed the intent to . .. stop [the
victim] from reporting abuse to the authorities or cooperating
with a criminal prosecution-rendering her prior statements
admissible under the forfeiture doctrine. Earlier abuse, or
threats of abuse, intended to dissuade the victim from
resorting to outside help would be highly relevant to this

inquiry.27
In the above passage, the Court seemingly concedes that the
requisite Giles intent might be inferred from distant interactions
between the defendant and witness, even if the murder itself involves
no such intent, and even if those acts occurred long before the murder
in question. Even more broadly, Justice Breyer interpreted Justice
Souter' s reading of this passage in his concurrence to mean "that a
showing of domestic abuse is [by itself] sufficient to call into play the

protection of the forfeiture rule."279 According to Justice Breyer,
inferring intent "when, in fact, the abuser may have had other matters
in mind apart from preventing the witness from testifying, is in effect
not to insist upon a showing of 'purpose."' 28 0 Thus, by "creating a
kind of presumption that will transform purpose into knowledgebased intent ... [in] domestic violence [cases,] ... the area where the

problem is most likely to arise[,]",2 8 1 the Giles majority significantly
undermined its own ruling.
Even before Giles, we see this same attenuated intent evidence
making the difference in cases beyond domestic abuse. For example,
the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit recently
deemed the intent requirement satisfied by two pieces of
circumstantial evidence: testimony based on unsubstantiated rumor,
and an alleged threat to individuals not implicated in the forfeiture
claim.28 2

In similar fashion, a New York federal court found

278

Id. at 2693 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
at 2708 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

279Id

280

Id.

282United States v. Martinez, 476 F.3d 961, 966-67 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (applying the
analogous intent requirement of Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6)).
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sufficient "circumstantialevidence from which the inference of prior
knowledge may be drawn. 283 The New Mexico Supreme Court has
also ratified the practice of inferring intent, both generally and in the
specific context presented in Giles. 2 84 Given Giles's explicit
endorsement of this practice in domestic abuse cases, prosecutors will
likely invoke this argument in a variety of post-Giles cases.
3. TransferringIntent
Pre-Giles decisions further eased prosecutors' burden of proving
intent by ruling that one wrongdoer's intent may be transferred to
another under complicity principles. Thus, in future cases involving
accomplice or conspiracy liability, we can expect prosecutors to
pursue this method of argument when Giles is invoked.
United States v. Cherry2 85 is illustrative. In Cherry, five
individuals were charged with involvement in a drug conspiracy:
Joshua Price, Michelle Cherry, LaDonna Gibbs, Teresa Price, and
Sonya Parker. 8 Much of the evidence relied upon by the governiment
came from a cooperating witness, Ebon Sekou Lurks, who was
murdered just prior to trial.28 At trial, the government moved to
admit Lurks's out-of-court statements, pursuant to Federal Rule of
Evidence 804(b)(6), on wrongful procurement grounds.2 88 Upon a
careful review, the district court held that Joshua Price procured the
289
absence of Lurks, making the statements admissible against him.
"It held, however, that there was . . .'absolutely no evidence [that
Cherry, Gibbs, and Parker] had actual knowledge of, agreed to or
participated in the murder of. ...Lurks."' 29 0 The court thus upheld
these defendants' confrontation objections and severed Joshua's case
from the others.
The government appealed and the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding
that co-conspirators can be deemed to have waived confrontation and
hearsay objections based on actions that are in furtherance, within the
scope, and reasonably foreseeable as a necessary or natural
283United States v. Mastrangelo, 561 F. Supp. 1114, 1119 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (emphasis
added),
affd, 722 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1983).
2
84 ee State v. Alvarez-Lopez, 98 P.3d 699, 705 (N.M. 2004) ("[W~e may be able to infer
a criminal defendant's murder of a key prosecution witness was intended to prevent the witness
from testifying at the defendant's trial."); see also State v. Romero, 133 P.3d 853, 855-56 (N.M.
Ct. App. 2006), aff'd, 156 P.3d 694 (N.M. 2007).
285 217 F.3d 811 (10Oth Cir. 2000).
286Id. at 813.
287Id.

at 814.
813.

288Id. at
289Id. at

814.
29OId. (quoting United States v. Price, No. CR-98-l0-S, order at 17 (E.D. Okla. Jan. 14,
1999)) (alteration and second omission in original).
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consequence of an ongoing conspiracy. 29 ' Turning to Federal Rule of
Evidence 804(b)(6), the court reasoned that the provision's use of the
words "'engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing"' indicates that waiver
can be imputed under an agency theory to a defendant who
"4'acquiesced"'~ in procuring a witness's unavailability but did not
actually ...engage[]" in wrongdoing apart from the conspiracy
292
itself.
In regards to Pinkerton liability, 293 the court declared that
"[flailure to consider Pinkerton conspiratorial responsibility [would]
afford[] too much weight to Confrontation Clause values in balancing
those values against the importance of preventing witness
tampering, 29 4 and that "a Pinkerton theory strikes a better balance
between the conflicting principles at stake." 29 5 The court thus
remanded the case for findings on the Pinkerton factors as they
related to Lurks's murder.2 9
Cases like Cherry, while admittedly supported by the language of
Rule 804(b)(6), are significant in that they signal a willingness to
transfer the requisite Giles intent from one defendant to another.
4. Shifting Burden of Proofto PartyAsserting ConfrontationRight
Invoking Reynolds, courts could shift the burden to the accused to
prove that he did not intend to "keep the witness away" from the trial.
This type of burden-shifting finds support in Reynolds.

29 1

Id at 813.

292I.at

815 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6)).
Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946), each conspirator may generally
be held liable for the crimes of all other co-conspirators if two requirements are met: (1) the
crimes were committed in furtherance of the objectives of the conspiracy; and (2) the crimes
were a natural and probable consequence of the conspiracy. Under Pinkerton, evidence of direct
participation in the commission of the substantive offense is not required. See Pinkerton, 328
U.S. at 645-48.
294Cherry, 217 F.3d at 820 (citing United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624 (10th Cit. 1979)).
295
1Id
29
6 Id. at 82 1. Before closing, the court addressed the effect of the district court's finding
that "'.there is absolutely no evidence' that defendants Cherry, Gibbs, and Parker (although not
Teresa Price) 'had actual knowledge of, agreed to or participated in the murder of Ebon Sekou
Lurks."' Id. (quoting United States v. Cherry, No. CR-98-l0-S, order at 17 (E.D. Okla. Jan. 14,
1999)). According to the court, this finding, while not clearly erroneous, does not foreclose the
possibility of waiver under a Pinkerton theory. Id. "Actual knowledge is not required for
conspiratorial waiver by misconduct if the elements of Pinkerton-scope, furtherance, and
reasonable foreseeability as a necessary or natural consequence-are satisfied." 1d. On the scope
issue, the court noted "that the scope of the cunspiracy is not necessarily limited to a primiary
goal-such as bank robbery--but can also include secondary goals relevant to the evasion of
apprehension and prosecution for that goal-such as escape, or, by analogy, obstruction of
justice." Id
293Under
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In Reynolds, the accused was on trial for bigamy, and the absent
witness was his alleged second wife.29 When officers went to the
Reynolds home to subpoena the witness, the accused repeatedly
informed the officers that the witness was not home, and "that she
[would] not appear in this case." 298 Unable to locate Mrs. Reynolds
prior to trial, the court admitted her testimony from a previous trial
for the same offense.2 9 Upon review of Reynolds's confrontation
objection, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court's action .30 0 The
Court's reasoning is instructive. The Court declared:
The accused was himself personally present in court when the
showing was made, and had full opportunity to account for
the absence of the witness, if he would, or to deny under oath
that he had kept her away. Clearly, enough had been proven
to cast the burden upon him of showing that he had not been
instrumental in concealing or keeping the witness away.
Having the means of making the necessary explanation, and
having every inducement to do so if he would, the
presumption is that he considered it better to rely upon the
weakness of the case made against him than to attempt to
develop the strength of his own.'0
The Reynolds Court contemplated shifting the burden from the
government to the accused where evidence suggests the accused may
have prevented the witness from testifying against him. Under this
approach, once an inference of intent-to-silence is established, a court
applying Giles could then require the defendant to present evidence
negating that inference.
The Reynolds opinion does not clearly indicate the precise
circumstances that caused the Court to place the burden on the
accused. The Court presumably believed the accused knew the
whereabouts of his second wife, but simply chose to withhold that
information so as to profit from his wife's absence. This situation is
quite different from that in Giles, where the witness is known to be
dead and the only question left open is the precise reason for her
killing. Thus, it seems Reynolds's burden-shifting approach might be
confined to cases involving witnesses who turn up missing just prior
to their scheduled court date, and where the defendant has an obvious
297Reynolds
298Id. at
299Id. at
30 d
301Id.

v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 146-48 (1878).
148-50.

150.
at 160.

at 160 (emphasis added).
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motive to prevent the testimony. Either way, the thrust of the decision
indicates that not all cases require evidence of actual intent, and that
courts may sometimes presume the ill intent required by Giles.
5. Using the ChallengedHearsay to Prove Forfeiture
If a hearing on forfeiture is required, federal courts generally
permit the prosecution to rely on the challenged hearsay evidence to
prove forfeiture. 302 However, some courts have explicitly refused to
3
do so, 303 and others have remained openly undecided . 04

The general rule permitting reliance upon hearsay at the forfeiture
hearing is grounded in federal evidence rules and in regular pre-trial
motion practice. For example, Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a)
declares that courts, in making determinations on the admissibility of
evidence "[are] not bound by the rules of evidence except those with

respect to privileges., 305 Because a judge brings considerable
experience to bear on the issue of how much weight to give the
evidence, and because preliminary determinations must be made
speedily without unnecessary duplication at trial, the judge generally
has discretion to admit reliable hearsay evidence at such hearings. 3
Given this well-recognized authority, we can expect courts in future
forfeiture hearings to admit hearsay evidence in analyzing intent
issues under Giles.
6. PartialIntent Sufficient
Most courts considering forfeiture claims have held that proof of a
partial intent is sufficient, implicitly recognizing that people often
commit acts with multiple motives. For example, the New Mexico
Supreme Court in State v. Alvarez-Lope 3 07 declared that "[tlhe State
'need not ...show that [Defendant's] sole motivation was to procure
302

See United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1982) (ruling that hearsay
evidence, including the grand jury testimony the government sought to introduce under the
forfeiture doctrine, is admissible in a hearing to determine whether defendant waived his
confrontation rights); see also United States v. Emery, 186 F.3d 921, 927 (8th Cir. 1999)
("inclined to doubt" that wrongful procurement must be proven independently of the challenged
hearsay).
303See, e.g., People v. Giles, 152 P.3d 433, 446 (Cal. 2007) ("[A] trial court cannot make a
forfeiture finding based solely on the unavailable witness's unconfronted testimony; there must
be independent corroborative evidence that supports the forfeiture finding."), cert. granted, 128
S. Ct. 976 (2008), vacated, 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008).
3
04See, e.g., United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 914 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that at
least partial reliance on hearsay is permissible, but leaving "for another day the issue of whether
a forfeiture finding could rest solely on hearsay").
305FED. R. EviD. 104(a).
3- Wite, 116 F.3d at 914.
307 98 P.3d 699 (N.M. 2004).
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defendant
the declarant's absence; rather, it need only show that the308
"was motivated in part by a desire to silence the witness.""'.
The Court of Appeal for the District of Columbia explained the
basis for this rule in United States v. Martinez,309 in which the
defendant argued that the would-be witness was killed out of
retaliation for his involvement with the police rather than to silence
him in the event of a future trial .3 10 The court reasoned that1
31
"Martinez's argument is based on a false either-or dichotomy."
According to the court, "[ilt is surely reasonable to conclude that
anyone who murders an informant does so intending both to exact
revenge and to prevent the informant from disclosing further
information and testifying. The two purposes often go hand-in-glove,
and this case is just another good example." 1
B. Broadening the Scope of Non- Testimonial Hearsay
Along with easing the burden of proving the requisite Giles intent,
courts will likely avoid Giles's reach by broadening the scope of
"non-testimonial" hearsay.
The Confrontation Clause applies only to testimonial hearsay. 3 13 In
Giles, Justices Thomas and Alito expressed doubt as to whether the
out-of-court statements in that case were actually "testimonial. 1
With the addition of the three dissenting Justices, had the issue been
properly preserved for appeal, a majority of Justices would have
likely3 1 . deemed the Confrontation Clause not offended by admission
of Avie's statements on these grounds. 1 Moreover, Justices Thomas
3081d. at 704-O5 (quoting United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 654 (2d Cir. 2001)); see
also United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1279 (1st Cir. 1996) (sole motivation not
requited, motivation in part is sufficient); Vasquez v. People, 173 P.3d 1099, 1104-05 (Colo.
2007) (en banc) (reaffirming the court's earlier rule that preventing the witness's testimony does
not have to be the defendant's sole motivation, but need only be one reason for the defendant's
actions).
3- 476 F.3d 961 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert denied, 128 S. Ct. 420 (2007).
310]d at 966.
311Id.
2

Id. (citation omitted).
See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 823-26 (2006) (answering affirmatively the
question of "whether the Confrontation Clause applies only to testimonial hearsay").
314
See Gibes v. California, 12 8 S. Ct. 2678, 2693-94 (2008) (Thomas, J., concurring); id
at 2694 (Alito, J., concurring).
315Tethree dissenting Justices in Giles do not clearly indicate how they would have ruled
on this issue. On this question, the dissent merely states: "It is important to underscore that this
case is premised on the assumption, not challenged here, that the witness' statements are
testimonial for purposes of the Confrontation Clause. With that understanding, we ask whether
the defendant, through his wrongdoing, has forfcitcd his Confrontation Clause right." Id. at 2695
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
316
See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004) (exempting non-testimonial
statements from Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether).
31
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and Alito each signaled a strong preference for restricting the
confrontation right through the "testimonial" gateway, rather than
through expansion of the forfeiture doctrine. 31 " As such, future
prosecutors will likely respond to confrontation claims in this

manner. 3

18

The Supreme Court has yet to define the term "testimonial,"
leaving its precise contours for future courts to define. The Crawford
Court explicitly refused to define the term, declaring:
We leave for another day any effort to spell out a
comprehensive definition of "testimonial." Whatever else the
term covers, it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a
preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial;
and to police interrogations. These are the modem practices
with closest kinship to the abuses at which the Confrontation
Clause was directed.3 1
While Crawford failed to provide a precise definition of the term
"testimonial, 3 20 it did declare that "testimony" typically involves
[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of
establishing or proving some fact."',32 ' According to the Court, "[a]n
accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers bears
testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an
acquaintance does not."3 22 This "core class" of statements includes
the following three categories of statements:
317

See Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2693-94 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 2694 (Alito, J.,
concurring).
318
See Lininger, supra note 189, at 766-67 (reporting that among the approximately 500
federal and state court opinions applying Crawford between March 8, 2004, and December 3 1,
2004, nearly one-third of the courts reaching the merits distinguished Crawford on the ground
that the statement in question is not testimonial, and many of these courts applied the Roberts
framework instead).
319Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 (footnote omitted).
320
"The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause provides that, '[uln all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right. ...to be confronted with the witnesses against
him."' Id. at 42 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI) (alteration and omission in original). The
Crawford Court made clear that the protections of the Confrontation Clause, by its terms, are
limited to those statements that are made by ...witnesses' against the accused." Id. at 51. As
such, the confrontation requirement does not apply to statements made by those not categorized
as a "witness,"~ itself a rather ambiguous term. According to the Court, "[olne could plausibly
read 'witnesses against' a defendant to mean those who actually testify' at trial, those whose
statements are offered at trial, or something in-between." Id. at 42-43 (citations omitted). Later,
the Court explained that ..'witnesses' against the accused [are] those who 'bear testimony."' Id
at 51 (quoting 2 WEBSTER, supra note 104). Thus, the scope of the term "witnesses against" is
defined by the scope of the term "testimony," hence the battle over the precise meaning of
"testimonial."
321Id (quoting 2 WEBSTER, supra note 104) (alteration in original).
322Id
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[1] "ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalentthat is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations,
prior testimony that the defendant was unable to
cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants
would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially," [2]
"extrajudicial
statements ...contained
in
formalized
testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior
testimony, or confessions," [3] "statements that were made
under circumstances which would lead an objective witness
reasonably to believe that the statement would be available
for use at a later trial." 3
On the other end of the spectrum are "non-testimonial" statements.
The Crawford Court portrayed this type of statement as"[n
off-hand, overheard remark," "a casual remark to an acquaintance,"
32 4
or "business records or statements in furtherance of a conspiracy.
In subsequent decisions, including Davis v. Washington,32 5 the
Supreme Court has retained its position that it would not define the
term "testimonial" beyond its three broad formulations above.3 2 The
Court has, however, provided helpful clarification in the context of
police interrogations. 32 7 The Crawford Court noted that most
statements offered up in police interrogations would be "testimonial,"
as such statements generally resemble the examinations conducted by
the justices of the peace in England that prompted the Confrontation
Clause's enactment.3 2 But in Davis the Court clarified that
"[~s]tatements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the
primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to
meet an ongoing emergency. 3 29 By contrast, such statements are
testimonial when there is no such ongoing emergency, and the
primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past
events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution. 3

3231d at 51-52 (citations omitted); see also State v. Jensen, 727 N.W.2d 518, 525 (Wis.
2007) (summarizing the various formulations the Supreme Court mentioned in Crawford).
324 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51, 56.
325547 U.S. 813 (2006).
26

3 1d. at
327

823.

See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52.
3 1d. ("Statements taken by police officers in the course of interrogations are also
testimonial under even a narrow standard. Police interrogations bear a striking resemblance to
examinations by justices of the peace in England. The statements are not s worn testimony, but
the absence of oath was not dispositive." (first emphasis added)).
329
See Davis, 547 U.S. at 822.
330Id.
28
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While Davis further clarified the distinction between testimonial
and non-testimonial statements (at least in the context of police
interrogations), there is still a great deal of ambiguity in these two
terms.31 Further, Giles appears to signal the Court's desire to define
the scope of the confrontation right in this manner rather than through
expanding its exceptions. A Sixth Circuit case decided prior to the
Court's Giles decision, United States v. GarCiaMeza,3 exemplifies
the type of case where we can expect courts to resolve the
confrontation claim through the testimonial gateway. Garcia-Meza, in
particular, stands out as a case where the equities point toward
admission of the out-of-court testimony, but where another method
for admitting the evidence would be needed in a post-Giles world.
In Garcia-Meza, the defendant, Severo Garcia-Meza, was
convicted of murdering his wife, Kathleen Floyd Garcia. 3 According
to the Sixth Circuit, around one o'clock in the morning on February
22, 2002, the defendant, Kathleen, and two of Kathleen's female
family members (Chelsie and Rosie Johnson) went to Gaspar Nunez's
home, who was a friend of the defendant' S.33 4 The group drank beer
for a few hours before Kathleen and the defendant began to fight .335
The defendant became angry that Kathleen had danced with Nunez's
roommate. 3 The defendant then grabbed Kathleen by the hair and
337
wrestled her to the floor.
Kathleen, Chelsie, and Rosie then left the premises and drove back
to Linda Holt's house.3 3 When Kathleen arrived at Linda's house,
"Kathleen and her sister went to Linda's bedroom[,] . . . [where
Kathleen] found her mother and her other sister, Calleen. 33 9 Shortly
thereafter, the defendant burst through the front door of the Holt
home, waking Calleen's boyfriend, Josh King. 340 According to King,
the "[djefendant went straight to Linda Holt's bedroom."3 4 ' When the
defendant reached the bedroom, "he tried to lure Kathleen out of the
331See. e.g., State v. Manuel, 697 N.W.2d 811, 822 (Wis. 2005) (expressing reluctance to
accept defendant's invitation to choose among the three Crawford formulations as the proper
test for measuring whether a statement is testimonial, and reserving for another day whether all
three of the Crawfordformulations, or perhaps an entirely different formulation, would become
its rule); see also Davis, 547 U.S. at 822 (explicitly not "attempting to produce an exhaustive
classification of all conceivable statemens... as either testimonial or nontestimonial").
332403 F.3d 364 (6th Cir. 2005).
33

d at 365-66.

~34Id. at 366.
335Id.
336

Id.

337
Id.
30Id. at 367.
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house. 4 When she refused, the defendant grabbed Kathleen's arm
with one hand, and reached back with his other and plunged a
steak-knife into Kathleen's chest. She died shortly thereafter. 4
The defendant's confrontation claim centered on evidence
presented from an incident of domestic abuse that occurred five
months prior to the murder.3 On September 9, 2001, the defendant
reported to police that Kathleen had intentionally damaged their
van. 345 When officers arrived, they found Kathleen about to slash the
van's tires. The officers then noticed that Kathleen had a bruised
cheek and jaw. 346 Kathleen told the officers the defendant had hit her.
Later that day, police received a second call from the same
residence. 347 At trial, over the defendant's objection,
[t]he officers testified that [Kathleen] had a tennis ball size
welt on her jaw, numerous cuts and bruises on her face and
leg, blood on her clothes, and complained of pain in her face,
back and ribs. Kathleen told the officers that the Defendant
cornered her in a bathroom, repeatedly punched her and
threatened to kill her.34
Kathleen also stated "the [d]efendant had beaten her because she had

talked to a former boyfriend earlier in the

day." 349

After admitting this

testimony, the trial court instructed the jury that this evidence was to
be considered to prove motive, intent, and capacity to commit

murder. 350

At trial, the defendant admitted he was responsible for Kathleen's
death, but claimed he was not guilty of first degree murder since he
was too intoxicated to have formed the required premeditation . 35 '1The
jury rejected this defense and found the defendant guilty of first
degree murder. 5 On appeal, the defendant argued that his Sixth
Amendment right to confrontation was violated when the district
court allowed the officers to testify that the defendant had beaten up
the victim because he was angry that she had been talking to a former

342

Id

343Id

345

d

346Id.
348Id

349Id.

35M

at 365-66.
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boyfriend. 5 Defendant argued that Kathleen's statements were
testimonial because they were given to police officers during an
ongoing criminal investigation. 5 The government, on the other hand,
argued that the statements were not testimonial since they were
35 5
excited utterances not elicited from structured police questioning.
Rather than resolving the case on this ground, the court instead ruled
that defendant had forfeited his right to confront Kathleen, and
declared:
We need not decide today
whether a victim's excited
utterance made to an investigating police officer is
testimonial, for the Defendant has forfeited his right to
confront Kathleen because his wrongdoing is responsible for
her unavailability. 5
...

In rejecting defendant's confrontation claim, the court reasoned
that because "there is no doubt that the [d]efendant is responsible for
Kathleen's unavailability . . . he has forfeited his right to confront
her." 357 Before closing, the court rejected what later became the intent
requirement adopted in Giles.35
Of course, had this case been decided post-Giles, this opinion
would have read much differently. Although we can only speculate as
to how the Sixth Circuit would have ruled in a post-Giles world, we
do know the court could have chosen one of the following options: (a)
upon review of the record, finding the defendant did (or did not) kill
his wife with the requisite intent; (b) remanding the case for the trial
court to determine the issue of intent; or (c) finding the statements
35

d at 366.

355While Davis and Hammon had yet to be decided at the time of this appeal, today we
know that the Davis-Hammon fr-amework would govern the issue of whether Kathleen's
September 9 statements would be deemed testimonial. That test requires courts to examine "the
primary purpose of the [police] interrogation" and to determine whether it was intended "to
enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency" or instead to establish or prove past
events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813,
822 (2006). It would seem that Kathleen's first set of statements could be deemed
non-testimonial, while her follow-up phone conversation could not. In the first event officers
arrived at the home during an actual incident, as Kathleen was about to slash the tires of the van.
Garcia-Meza, 403 F.3d at 367. In the second conversation, however, Kathleen simply called to
report an incident of abuse occurring earlier that dlay. Id
356
Garcia-Meza, 403 F.3d at 370.

35M at 370-71 ("The Supreme Court's recent affirmnation of the 'essentially equitable
grounds' for the rule of forfeiture strongly suggests that the rule's applicability does not hinge
on the wrongdoer's motive. The Defendant, regardless of whether he intended to prevent the
witness from testifying against him or not, would benefit through his own wrongdoing if such a
witness's statements could not be used against him, which the rule of forfeiture, based on
principles of equity, does not permit.").
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non-testimonial, and therefore admissible. Given the heinous nature
of the defendant's crime, and given his admission to the killing, my
thought is that the court would have sought a similar outcome even
post-GileS3 59 --option (c) would have given the court that ability.
Further, a majority of the Giles Justices would be likely to affirm that
result.
CONCLUSION

The rather rigid Crawford requirements created a need for broad
exceptions to its rule, and the Supreme Court in both Crawford and
Davis explicitly ratified the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine as such
an exception. Acting pursuant to these endorsements, lower courts
post-Crawford expanded the reach of the forfeiture doctrine. One of
the common methods employed by those courts was to reject an
intent-to-silence requirement. However, just three years after
Crawford, the Supreme Court in Giles uprooted these decisions by
reading an intent requirement into the forfeiture rule.
The need for a stronger, not weaker, forfeiture doctrine remains in
Crawford's wake. Being an equitable concept, the forfeiture doctrine
will sometimes counsel toward admission of the disputed hearsay
despite no evidence of intent-to-silence. This is true regardless of the
perceived scope of the forfeiture doctrine at the time of the founding.
Accordingly, we can expect many post-Giles courts to circumvent the
Giles rule by one of two methods. First, prosecutors will advocate
easier means of proving the requisite intent, such as inferring intent
from circumstantial evidence or shifting the burden of disproving
intent to the accused. Second, prosecutors will seek to broaden the
definition of "non-testimonial" in order to remove the evidence from
Crawford's reach. Given the frequency by which lower courts
employed these methods before Giles, and given the Giles Court's
admitted responsiveness to these two types of claims, these arguments
should prove successful.

39

5 Also, by rejecting the appellant's argument that the statement's prejudicial effect
outweighed its probative value, the Garcia-Mezacourt arguably signaled an underlying desire to
uphold the admission of these hearsay statements.

